Showing posts with label morality. Show all posts
Showing posts with label morality. Show all posts

Monday, May 12, 2025

On the Good of Young Men Having Their Asses Kicked

I recently visited a martial arts school for kids, and was immediately impressed by - something. It took me a minute to put my finger on what I liked about the place. It was that they were serious, and firm. The instructors wanted these kids to get better, and they didn't need to crack a joke every minute to diffuse tension, or even be especially kind about criticizing someone's technique. And the kids responded well to it, and were focused, and improving. I found myself wishing to see more of this approach, and then wondering why.

Young men having their asses kicked by superiors genuinely interested in the improvement of those young men, is an individual and social good. I express my concern and record my defense herein because I think many young men today should have their asses kicked more. If you're a young man reading this, know that I was once a young man; also, that I should definitely have had my ass kicked more. Below I define ass-kicking, and explain why I believe this.

By "ass kicking" I don't mean physically, and I also don't mean pointless abuse. What I do mean is this - in second person to help you imagine and identify with it:
  1. there is a person with higher status than you

  2. they are training you and/or managing you, and they provide intense, frequent negative verbal feedback and potential consequences for underperformance...

  3. for reasons in your best interest (this is critical)

  4. who you won't avoid - because you recognize that tolerating their very negative feedback will help you improve as a person, at specific skills, and achieve your goals.
Expanding on each item above:
  1. "Higher status" means the person has objective, measurable achievements that place them unambiguously above you - money, artistic production, athletics, climbing some ladder - that you are also in. If you're trying to be a better electrician, you don't care if an investment banker or mountain climber gives you critical feedback.

  2. This intense, frequent, negative feedback is unpleasant for many reasons, among them that it concerns something you care very much about - some ability or position that you have chosen as part of your identity. The unfortunate paradox is that meaningful negative feedback hurts, and it has to hurt at least a little, if you actually care about the thing you're getting feedback about.

  3. The person is actually trying to help you improve, often to very high standards - this is why it's not abuse - but their concern in helping you improve takes precedence over hurt feelings. Hurt feelings take time and attention to avoid, so by virtue of your superior not having to consider them, you improve faster. What's more, during ass-kicking, the atmosphere is serious. There is no tension release mechanism other than improving your performance. (As an aside, the ass-kickee often attempts humor is in these situations, to his detriment.)

  4. You choose not to avoid the unpleasantness because you know this experience is in your own best interest, and therefore despite its unpleasantness, you choose to carry on; or you're in a setting you can't leave (e.g. the military) but fortunately your superior is trying to improve you rather than just abuse you.

Some examples of institutionalized ass-kicking are sports coaching, medical school, the apprenticeship process in certain high-performing high-status industries (e.g. high finance), and military training. (For a first-person account of a military boot camp, and interestingly, a distinction between cult abuse and military indoctrination, go here.) Near-universally, people who've been through an ass-kicking program express gratitude for the experience (after it's over) and recognize both the skills and personal transformation it imparted, but are quick to say they wouldn't want to do it again, possibly along with humorous stories of the most difficult superiors who kicked their ass particularly thoroughly.


Why is ass-kicking a good thing? And why am I focusing on young men?

Why am I specifiying young men? Let's broadly define "young" as 13-30. After this developmental window, it is very difficult to change identity and personality in the way that ass-kicking does, and in particular to obtain the benefits such experiences can produce. And I find that it's usually men who have a personality structure and defenses that most benefit from such experiences. A young man's psychological defenses involve a good deal of narcissism about how tough, strong, and awesome he is. When encountering situations suggesting otherwise, he rationalizes, avoids, or attacks. If anyone tells him he's not the greatest thing since sliced bread, he denigrates and/or retaliates and/or disengages. But when it's his superior (his supervisor in a job he wants to advance in) or drill sergeant doing it and he can't rationalize avoid or attack, he has three choices: a) fail b) be miserable because he can never understand that they're not just abusing him personally or c) he "gets it" and grows up and improves, not just in specific skills but in overall character.

It is my suspicion that, not only is ass-kicking happening less often, but also that option c) is being delayed in men's lives and more often happening during romantic relationships; and romantic partners are not enjoying the expansion of their near-parentified duties. Of course it's not only men who can ever benefit from ass-kicking, and certainly not all men will benefit from ass-kicking based on their constitution, but in my empirical observation, in general young men benefit most from ass-kicking.

Why is ass-kicking good? Beyond (obviously) the specific skills and professional identities that are being quickly learned and grown, the general benefits come down to three factors.

  • A. We learn to control our negative emotional reactions and decouple them from the person providing the feedback. This is necessary unless you plan to go through life always killing the messenger (which some men certainly try to do.)

  • B. We learn to recognize our flaws and shortcomings and tolerate the distress arising from them, and to turn that energy into something positive by working on them instead of being angry about them, denying them, or avoiding them. We also learn that our position in a hierarchy is not the entirety of our worth and identity. (Note, both B and A are really both forms of "tolerating the distress of being at the wrong end of a hierachical disparity." This both makes young men better able to work in groups, and produces empathy which they might otherwise lack, when they are later at the top of such an imbalance, not to mention improving reality-based confidence.)

  • C. Not only do we decouple our emotional reactions to the person and the message, we learn to respect the person and recognize that they are helping us, even if it wasn't fun at the time.

A, B, and C correspond basically to "I have a long way to go to be a badass, it's okay that I have a long way to go but it's up to me to improve and I can improve, and while it's not fun now, I recognize that my superior did me a favor and that they're in the position where they are for a reason so I will respect and defend them to others." It adds up to the cliche character-building as well as dealing with adversity, being able to function in authority structures and understanding the basis for legitimate authority, i.e. that authority is not synonymous with force. In terms of Kegan and Chapman's hierarchy, ass-kicking is a maturing process that helps young men graduate from level 3 into level 4, and failure to do so has predictable consequences for broader society (see last paragraph.)

To be clear, nothing herein should be taken as justifying abuse. In fact, I think outlining the characteristics of ass-kicking helps us draw a distinction between ass-kicking and mere abuse. And even when an ass-kicking superior intends the ass-kicking constructively to improve the ass-kickee, if the ass-kickee can't tolerate it, they should be able to quit (withdraw consent.) Abuse is non-consensual, and is about pleasing a sadistic abuser, rather than (in the long run) helping the recipient. Those of us nodding along with this essay and agreeing that ass-kicking is a good thing and was a good thing for us specifically, are usually still able to look back and distinguish between a hardass who you maybe even hated at that time but for whom in retrospect you feel gratitude and respect - versus a bully with an anger problem. (Of course abusers try to trick us sometimes by pretending to be ass-kickers.) Many readers will by this point be thinking of Sergeant Hartmann from Full Metal Jacket (note these links are NSFW and contains slurs) - he is hard but he is fair, directly states you will not like him, but he is trying to help his recruits and he tells them so. He is clearly pleased when they improve. He is an ass-kicker. In contract, Alec Baldwin's character in Glengarry Glen Ross is just an abusive bully, and the ages of some of the men in the meeting suggest they are beyond the useful ass-kicking window anyway. He explicitly tells them he doesn't care about them, and just wants numbers for the company, figure out on your own how to do it or hit the bricks pal. Without Good Result A above, young men are more likely to keep thinking everyone who tells them something they don't want to hear is just another Alec Baldwin humiliating them.


Why did I write this?

It's my impression that opportunities for ass-kicking have decreased over the past half-century or so, at least in my country, the U.S. Why? I suspect it's a combination of our worsening intolerance of direct-speaking authority figures, and constant consumer messaging: that you are special, you are the best, you should never be uncomfortable, don't listen to people who make you feel that way. Those two reasons may or may not in fact be the same thing. (I intentionally use "impression" and "suspect" not as weasel words but as clear signals of how you might weight these claims.) Therefore, as young men's opportunities for ass-kicking decrease, I predict America will face a worsening epidemic of narcissistic, oversensitive, immature, and adversity-intolerant men, who blame everyone else for e.g. why they couldn't finish college or hold down a job, and who can't tell the difference between bullies and legitimate authority. I leave it to the reader to decide if this trend is already visible.

Tuesday, December 20, 2022

Denialisms Are About Moral Authority, Not Truth

Sovereign citizens (hereafter sovcits) stick out among the various species of denialists.  Other denialisms are at least about matters of fact - even if the denialists demonstrate poor critical thinking, at least their core assertion is a truth claim.  The Earth is round, or it is flat.  Vaccines cause autism, or they do not.  9/11 was an inside job, or it was not. 

But sovcits extend their beliefs into having a kind of power of their own; that their legal pronouncements have some kind of magic power to them. When surfing Youtube for "sovereign citizen" you won't have to look long for Youtube videos of the form:

  1. Sovcit gets pulled over, stopped, or otherwise detained by police.

  2. Sovcit recites their legal incantation.

  3. Sovcit, quite amazingly, somehow manages to be shocked when the police break their window, tase them, arrest them, etc. (Here is a perfect example, but don't watch it unless you are ready to see police violence.)

Creationists and Flat Earthers mostly agree with the same basic observations of the world, and they mostly don't make different decisions about how to live in the world based on their claims. I've never seen a creationist argue against the existence of island gigantism or dwarfism, or a flat Earther against the existence of the horizon - they just have a different explanation.

You might make the argument that as a denialism, the "theories" of sovereign citizens have domain-specific characteristics. After all, law requires a belief in its legitimacy to work, and they just claim legitimacy for a different set of rules, rules which affect our behavior on a daily basis. But this still doesn't really address the way in which sovcits seem different from the rest. Imagine that an evil neuroscientist plants in your head the belief that vaccines cause autism. Once under the spell of that denialism, you can predict that you would act the same way as other anti-vaxxers, avoiding immunizations, attending anti-vaccine protests, etc. But the thought experiment doesn't work for sovcits. The evil neuroscientist puts the belief in your head that the current American government is illegitimate. You STILL wouldn't think that you could Jedi-mind-trick your way out of a traffic stop, even though you would be frustrated by living under the thumb of the current regime. In fact we don't need an evil neuroscientist to demonstrate this - assuming you believe the Russian invasion of Ukraine is illegitimate, then you consider the political authority of the Russian government in the occupied territories to be similarly illegitimate. If you found yourself in Ukraine, would you go walking across an open field into the occupied territories loudly reciting "The U.N. says this is an illegal war and you can't be here" and then adding with surprise "Hey, you shot me!" No, because you recognize the physical reality even if you disagree as to who the legitimate authority is. But that's exactly what these sovereign citizens are doing.

And there, exactly, we see what DOES unite all these denialisms. In all of them, including the sovereign citizens, the core aspect is a disagreement as to the true source of moral authority. The different truth claims are a symptom of that underlying disagreement, and only in the sovereign citizens is the root cause so exposed.

A lot of other seemingly unrelated aspects of denialism start to snap into place now. Creationists believe the source of authority on the story of our origin is the Bible (or Quran), and by undermining religious cosmogony, ultimately we undermine religious morality (hence why creationists are overwhelmingly religious, hence their bizarre non sequiturs that teaching evolution leads to drug culture and promiscuity.) And I'm not sure who the moon landing people or 9/11 truthers think is a good moral authority, but I'm damn sure they do NOT think it's the United States government. And if you think the people telling you to wear a mask and get vaccinated are the same immoral elites making your favorite President look bad by calling attention to the pandemic, then no mask and no vaccines for me! Some people have a psychological makeup that is so polarized toward respect for authority that not only does it dominate truth, it becomes conflated with it. Sovereign citizens think that objective truth equals objective and irresistible authority, which is why they're inevitably shocked when physical reality disagrees with their perceived moral authority.

We neglect and misunderstand the complicated and ancient relationship between truth and authority at our peril.

Sunday, September 13, 2020

Classifying Humans Is Not Inherently Bad. In Fact It's Often Good.

When I was a psychiatry resident one of my supervisors told me her classification scheme for her fellow psychiatrists: there are fuzzies, and there are techies. Fuzzies are more the stereotype you might hold of people in the mental health field - people who are innate nurturers and speak in a soothing voice, and enjoy a holistic instinctual approach to helping people. They might have ethnic vases in their office. In contrast, techies are psychiatrists who like to think about neurotransmitters and circuits and diagnostic classifications, and use explicit reasoning processes about those to help patients. They read science fiction and dress like engineers.

I think there is indeed a spectrum of this sort, and I think it exists not just in humans, but in the world at large. And I see an increasing moral disgust on the part of fuzzies against techies.

Classifying humans is not bad. Humans are fascinating. Why wouldn't you pay attention to the endless ways in which they vary? (Have I given myself away as a techie yet?) But to fuzzies, an urge to assign humans to abstract categories of any sort can seem bad - creepy, even - a gateway to dehumanizing and harming them. "You should just care about about people!", they say. "Why is that so hard?"

These two urges - to care and to classify - are not mutually exclusive. In fact, they are mutually reinforcing to the important outcome, namely, people getting better. They should both be present in any healthy cognitively diverse group of humans. They're just not usually present to the same degree within each individual brain.

There are a lot of us who want to help people, but don't have that innate nurturing instinct. So we make an end run around that, and we think in explicit categories: person #1 has trait A, and might benefit from X (and it doesn't matter whether we're talking about psychiatric treatment, public policy, or understanding why someone is feeling a certain emotion right now.) To a nurturer, this might sound abhorrent. But if it helps, does it matter what cognitive process we use to accomplish it?

Because we humans do vary in this dimension, this ironically means we vary in our ability to understand people at the other end of the spectrum. To us techies, when we encounter fuzzies' offense, it's surprising and baffling. "No no no, you've got it all wrong. I like this person! I find her interesting! She is the first native speaker of a Nilotic language I've met and that makes her cognitively unique among people I know and capable of contributing uniquely!" From many fuzzies' perspectives, this kind of classification seems almost "racism-adjacent" - indeed, a stone's throw from phrenology.

A fair criticism of techies is that classification can be wrong, and can be used for bad purposes, e.g. phrenology (a dead horse which has been dead for a long time but which people love to bring up - until someone can find us a living phrenologist, let's all retire this cliche.) And yes, it is possible that thinking of people only in terms of their abstract traits and membership in various groups can dehumanize them, if it is done with no real interest in the individual, by reducing their identity to membership in collectives.* It can feel intrusive and "script"-reinforcing. On the other hand, a defense of techies is that their interest is a genuine interest in humans, their makeup is generally such that this is the most natural way of relating, and this is all an effort to connect and understand other people. The very abstractness of these categories means that they are universal - to a techie, the fact we can all be classified in along the same dimensions actually feels quite equalizing!

An also-fair criticism of fuzzies is that often, the self-image and need to signal tribal identity with certain kinds of statements overwhelms consideration of others' actual needs. ("Did you actually measure the outcome of your caring act?") And nurturing does not always help. Some people, for example, are indifferent to (or even enjoy) the suffering of others (i.e., antisocial personality disorder) and no amount of nurturing will change that; thus, the blind eye often turned to this population in mental health care, because the cognitive dissonance their existence causes to nurturers is extreme. It should also be pointed out that the neurochemical basis of nurturers' behavior, oxytocin, is not a love hormone so much as an ingroup hormone. All that nurturing ultimately requires an outgroup, and many a techie can tell stories of deliberate censure and exclusion by fuzzies for some poorly understood offense. A defense of fuzzies is that they are more genuinely motivated by the positive affect of the recipients of their caring attention, and therefore, probably better at taking care of people in the short-run.


*Speaking as a techie: intersectionality seems quite deliberately dehumanizing, in that it explicitly argues the most important thing about each of us is the various racial and gender groups we're part of - and since our membership in these groups is involuntary, this strips identity of any aspect of agency.

Saturday, February 8, 2020

Why Is Pursuit of Pleasure a "Third Rail" in Central Authoritarian Agricultural Societies?

A friend related the following to me. While she was an undergraduate, her grandparents came to visit and took her out to lunch. At the time she was dating a man of Middle Eastern descent. During the meal it became clear that her grandparents' true mission was not to buy her lunch, but to warn her about Middle Eastern men. They didn’t seem to be disturbed by her being with a non-Christian or ethnically different partner, so much as they were worried about her being in danger of abduction. "You know, when you get married and go back to their countries with them, you have no rights," her grandfather said. "Oh Grandpa," my friend responded somewhat innocently, "I really have no intention of marrying this guy." Her grandparents’ faces drained of color, and the conversation ended, and the rest of the meal was spent in icy silence.

To put it plainly: they were horrified that their granddaughter basically just told them that she was in this relationship for the sex, with no intention of commitment to marriage or reproduction. For them, this was far more serious than the prospect that she would be kidnapped and effectively enslaved! Why? Because she was acknowledging that she was making decisions in the pursuit of sexual pleasure. Of course in American culture and in most places, there is a double standard between men and women, but men are not immune to such attitudes either, though the social consequences are rarely as severe.

This may be part of why homosexual relationships have produced negative reactions across so many cultures - certainly not in all, but in enough for it to be a pattern. At least as often as they are accepted, they are either ignored or reviled. Why? Because gay sex can only result in pleasure. By these standards, an abomination if ever there was one!

But it's not just sex; it's the discussion of pursuit of pleasure in general. In very formal settings, any acknowledgement that you do something just because you like it feels very inappropriate. At a morbidity and mortality conference (where surgical residents stand up and accept blame for bad outcomes of cases - few settings are more formal or tense) I noted with some surprise that a physician even noting that he enjoyed his breakfast was met with uncomfortable laughter, eye-rolling or shifting in seats. The acknowledgement of enjoying any sort of physical pleasure seems to decrease, the more formal the setting, and this was an excellent example.[1] This is so basic to social reality that we don't notice or question it. Why is this?

Allan Tate said that civilization is an agreement to ignore the abyss. This is actually too limited. More to the point, civilization is an agreement to ignore affect - to ignore the primary drives in our basic animal code, and the reactions they cause in us, and the abyss causes anxiety. So it's not just the pursuit of pleasure we avoid, but the recognition of and response to affect in general - because affect can be dangerous. In social animals, affect is contagious, which is very effective for cohesion in hunter-gatherer groups below the Dunbar number (150 people.) But in any large civilization where we're constantly interacting with strangers in (necessarily) formalized settings, paying attention to and reacting to the affect on others' faces would seem to be inherently destabilizing. Try it when you go for a walk in a busy city some time - at best, you'll quickly be exhausted, and at worst you'll get into fights. And constantly talking about your pursuit of pleasure with strangers can make people resent you, or compete with you, or avoid you, and in general is a ticket to negative affect. The higher the stakes, the less we do it. In therapy training, we're "de-programmed" so that we don't just notice, but pursue affect, even when it flashes across faces for only a moment, and this de-programming is very difficult.

If this theory is correct, there should be other trends of affect-generating cultural practices that differ between hunter-gatherer and centralized agricultural societies, and that are at their most intense in the oldest longest-centrally-organized agricultural society (i.e. China and East Asia); and that are at their most intense in formal settings, like religion and many high-prestige professions.[2] To this end:
  • I have found qualitative assertions (but not quantitative studies) that homosexuality is more tolerated in more traditional societies, often with specific institutionalized roles.

  • Gender roles in general become more rigid in the transition from hunter-gatherer to agricultural.

  • There is a trend toward brighter colors in the art and clothing of cultures that more recently converted from hunter-gatherer to agricultural (or "small-village" agricultural to nation-state.) Yes, bright colors are often used in nation-states - in specific settings (religious displays, holidays, weddings.)

  • Drums tend to disappear as a central musical instrument in this transition as well, only to have re-appeared recently in the West in rock and hip-hop - possibly because, ironically, our wealth has allowed us to ignore social restrictions and revert back to our "native state" as hunter-gatherers, as in Hanson's theory of farmers vs foragers.

  • In the hunter-gatherer to centralized agricultural authority transition, hallucinogens become restricted (often to religious ceremonies) or outright banned.

  • There are exceptions to these rules, in the sense that these things which disappear in the transition still do appear under closed settings controlled by and useful to central authority - war chants, group initiations, religious artifacts and ceremonies, and team sports with big audiences.

  • Bright colors, rhythmic music, hallucinogens, the spread of gender equality and tolerance of sexual minorities, and sex-openly-for-pleasure all reappeared in the West as we transitioned from agricultural back to hunter-gatherer values in the late 20th century, as per Hanson's theory.

These affect-restricting cultural practices can be thought of as a Dunbar's number multiplier, by decreasing the frequency of group fission events. Others are exapting family psychology to the state (leader as father figure, fellow soldiers as brothers) and organizing society into stable hierarchies (family, village, ethnic group, state.) If we assume that agricultural states ultimately win out over foragers - which they consistently have since the Great Stand on the Ugra and the fall of the Yuan Dynasty - then there is a form of selection for groups which develop such multipliers.[3]

A major cultural technology and Dunbar's multiplier is controlled tolerance. It is difficult for people with different moral systems to closely co-exist. The Ottomans had the millet system, China and the Mongols had a theocratically laissez faire approach, and in the modern West many countries build freedom of conscience into the law, though avoiding leg-breaking and pocket-picking by neighbors with different convictions was realistically much easier in Jefferson's wide-open agrarian utopia.


FOOTNOTES

[1] Psychiatrists are less formal than surgeons in our meetings and I am pleased to report much more comfortable talking about food.

[2] Americans in particular might object that there are many high-status arenas in the U.S. which are now fairly informal, for instance technology, the entertainment industry, or academia. I would argue that apparently informal, high-prestige professions are actually formal in a more complex way. This is clearest in academia, but true for the others, that this apparent informality is not so much superficial as an another layer of complexity to let the ambitious signal that they can maneuver even under the paradox of forced "relaxed collegiality." Sure someone can wear jeans to work and set their own hours - but come back in 15 years and see who's setting budgets, and it probably won't be them.

[3] The current greatest combination of Dunbar's number multipliers remains China at about 9.2 million.

Sunday, September 29, 2019

Complex Dynamic Systems Like Cells, Humans, and Nations Cannot Avoid Cycles of Paroxysmal Disillusionment and Suffering

The following principles apply to any dynamic complex system, including organisms, individual people, or organizations - corporations, nations, or religions. They demonstrate that distortions will inevitably accumulate in the behavior of such a system, causing paroxysmal shocks and suffering.

Let's define a system as a set of components discrete from the rest of the universe. Let's define dynamic complex systems as ones that are high-information relative to the rest of the universe around them, high enough that in the absence of opposing forces, entropy passively favors irreversible changes happening to the arrangement of the system's elements which make it no longer discrete.[1] If such a set of components that exists now is going to exist more-or-less unchanged in the future, it has to perform actions[2] - it has to be dynamic - which reduce its own entropy at the expense of the rest of the universe.[3] The rest of the universe may include similar systems.[4] (Going forward, when I say "system" I mean "complex dynamic system.")

The seven principles are outlined below, then described in more detail.

  1. A system must be mostly concerned with its own perpetuation, or it will not persist. "If a complex dynamic system has been around for a while, it's designed to last and expend energy to do so."

  2. It must do this by reflecting - reacting to - aspects of the rest of the universe. Aspects of the rest of the universe important enough to make the system tend to develop ways to change its state in response to them are called stimuli. A more familiar statement of this principle: "That which gets measured, gets addressed."

  3. A measurement always contains less information, and is therefore not a full or fully accurate representation, of the thing being measured. Perception cannot exactly be reality; "this is not a pipe."

  4. Over time, the focus on self-perpetuation leads a system to become concerned with itself to the point of minimizing the importance of or responses to aversive stimuli to avoid altering its state (which is also aversive.) "Everything that gets measured, eventually gets gamed" or "All metrics eventually become useless." (Also known as Goodhart's Law or Campbell's Law.)

  5. The system's responses become increasingly un-moored from the external world, favoring its own perpetuation over other functions, and/or having a severely distorted model of the world and reaction to stimuli. "Eventually, everything becomes a racket [and/or gets delusional]." Another term for this is representational entropy.

  6. The distortions accumulate until a sufficiently destructive stimulus occurs (a shock), which either reorients the system (usually accompanied by severe aversive stimuli), or destroys the system. If the system survives, such shocks will happen repeatedly, but necessarily unpredictably. This is called inherent cyclic crisis.

  7. This is inherent to any self-perpetuating dynamic complex system, and because these shocks are correctly perceived as worsening survival, they cause inevitable suffering. We can call this the Final Noble Truth, a vague parallel to the Buddhist First Noble Truth.


Following is an expansion on each principle.

Principle 1: "If a complex dynamic system has been around for a while, it's designed to last and expending energy to do so." If a system is going to continue existing, a top priority on self-preservation is mandatory, and self-preservation must be the primary influence on perception by and reactions of the system. Since Darwin, thinking of organisms in this way is not revolutionary. But the same principle applies to any other complex system, including human organizations. Corporations have a relatively clear function in this way (they can't keep making money for shareholders if they don't keep existing) but it's more surprising for most of us to think of religions, countries, or volunteer organizations in this way. The converse: if a complex dynamic system is not expending energy on its self-perpetuation, it will not exist for long. (Many apparent mysteries, like the transparently weak business plans of many a Web 1.0 company, are resolved on realizing that they are not in equilibrium and will perish quickly. And indeed they did.)

Principal 2: "What gets measured, gets addressed." This seems obvious enough, especially to those of us at all interested in organizational dynamics, but principal 1 directs the kinds of things that have to be measured if the system will persist, and principal 2 says that there is always some difference between the measurement, and the totality of the outside world; that is, there is always going to be at least some important information missed, and what is missed cannot be acted upon. Concretely speaking, genes reflect the outside world by establishing sensor networks that interact across the inflection point (the cell membrane, or in the case of multicellular organisms, the body.) Some sensor networks have become very rapid and fine-grained reflections of the outside world - xenobiotic metabolism enzymes (which have reacted in only millennia, and the genetics differ considerably even between groups of humans), adaptive immune systems (which also differ between groups of humans and react in minutes), and of course nervous systems are the paragon.[5] But all of them make sacrifices and do not (cannot) sample all of the possible information available. It should be pointed out that living things do not have to constantly repeat the mantra "what gets measured gets addressed" because that's how they're already built and behave, automatically and obligatorily, as was the case for eons' worth of their ancestors. This is not the case with human organizations, which are new developments in nature, and may not be in equilibrium - so those organizations that you notice do not measure important (survival-supporting) data are unlikely to exist for long either. Whatever corporations or their descendants exist in a million years, it won't be ones that didn't respond to relevant metrics. (Added later: A more generalized description of this process is called value capture, as described by philosophy professor C. Thi Nguyen at the University of Utah. Very briefly, value capture occurs when an individual encounters a group with a simplified, quantified version of their own values, often driven by considerations external to the agent. The additional component relative to "what gets measured gets addressed" is that in value capture, there is feedback from the simplified quantified value system to the individual, distorting and oversimplifying their own values.)

Principle 3: Perception cannot exactly be reality; "this is not a pipe." Representations - measurements - are never the same as the things themselves, and incentives are never aligned perfectly with desired outcomes (almost trivial; otherwise, perfect alignment means identity, that is, the incentives are the desired outcomes.) There must always be a limit on information collected, and inferences are not always correct. There is infinite information a system could in theory collect about the universe (looking for correlations between each datum or set of data), but the system is more likely to perpetuate itself the more the information it collects, and the more impactful the information it collects. It is this design choice by the system to sense survival-relevant data that turns one of infinite facts about the world around the system into a stimulus. Obviously, which things it chooses takes as stimuli - what it measures - are relevant. (Not to mention if the system is in competition, especially with others using the same resources, there are time and resource limitations on the system on how much data to collect before altering its state.) The implication is that there is a limited set of information collected out of all possible information - what the system receives as stimuli - and these stimuli are necessarily very heavily biased toward self-perpetuation.[6]

Principal 4: "Everything that gets measured, eventually gets gamed." This is similarly familiar, and here is where the tension is set up. Systems must perceive (measure) and react to their environment. Their measurements are not the same as the thing in the environment, only a reflection. Because of this, systems react to the measurement - the perception - not the thing that is being measured. This is not a trivial difference. Anyone who has worked at a large corporation or applied to professional school is familiar with this, and we all know examples where an endpoint was achieved in an only-technical, meaningless way that did not advance toward the real-world goal outside the organization that the endpoint was meant to incentivize. To "follow the letter but not the spirit" is an aphorism which expresses this. Case in point: many companies have sexual harassment or racial sensitivity training. These often take the form of instructional videos with quizzes after them. Most people skip and fast-forward through the videos as fast as possible to register as if they watched the whole thing, often having two different types of browsers open so when they get to the quiz they can go back if the answers aren't obvious. Of course this raises the question of whether there are some types of training where the written tests to get the credential have nothing to do with performing the actual work. For example, in the early-to-mid twentieth century, people became scientists because they liked being in labs, were good at organizing experiments, and in general got immediate feedback directly from their work, and therefore performed better, and therefore were recognized for it by peers and superiors, moreso than is the case now.[7] Do the best GRE scores (and administrative maneuvering, and recommendations, and tolerance of modern graduate school politics) really correlate with the best scientists? Or, does the same process produced skilled and caring physicians? (See Paul Graham's essay The Lesson to Unlearn.) For examples in individual humans, take your pick of any of a host of brain receptor-tricking molecules like opioids or alcohol, as well as immature psychological defenses like denial. Cancer is another example. Multicellular organisms have many checks on uncontrolled cell growth and spread, but there is a perverse natural selection our entire lives for cancer. Unlike infection or physical injury, cancer doesn't hurt until it's about to kill you, thanks to both the earlier reproduction of our ancestors relative to the later onset of cancer, along with the black swan of radiation and brand-new-to-nature chemicals that there was never any reason to develop an alarm system for.[5][8]

Another type of distortion has to do with the structure of the system, which effects the way it behaves, rather than perceptions per se. It's long been noticed that corporations become less "nimble" (responsive to market change; ie the relevant universe outside the corporation) as their surface area-to-volume ratio goes down.[9] The higher the surface area-to-volume ratio, the more information that can be collected and the more effective responses can be. Think of bloated giants like big automakers or old engineering companies, where in Dilbert-like fashion people think more about maneuvering in their jobs, coordinating with other departments within the company ("transfer pricing") or competing with other people within the company than they do about their outside-the-company competitors or serving the market. This certainly occurs within states as well, where to various extents for Chinese dynasties, the Roman Empire, and the Spanish colonial empire their downfall was more the result of special interest maneuvering and other intrigues directing attention consistent inward to the court - because what could be going on that's more important outside the palace walls where the barbarians are than inside where the power is? So we have Zheng He's fleet being recalled, Roman patricians scheming in the absence of a succession rule to get legions on your side, or Spanish royalty neglecting overseas possessions until the British and their offspring eat your lunch.[10] There's a final type of distortion which arises from the way that nervous systems save time and money: the more some stimulus-response pairing occurs, the less reward-sensitive it becomes. It moves from being a conscious act requiring effort and concentration, to a habit, to (in biology, programmed through evolution) a stereotyped movement, then a reflex. Once a stimulus-response pairing has started moving down the line it is almost impossible to move it back other than by over-writing it with another stimulus-response pairing.

Principle 5: "Eventually, everything becomes a racket [and/or gets delusional]." This quote is attributed to the late George Carlin. An occult paraphrasing of this in more specifically politics terms is "The state is primarily concerned with itself." Here we can see the full flowering of the problems buried in the earlier principles. There is a constant tension between the need for negative feedback, which the system avoids - that's what aversive stimuli are for - but because the measurement and the thing measured are not the same, the metric is game-able, and the system avoids these stimuli increasingly by gaming them rather than taking real action. (And simultaneously makes un-helpful-to-survival end-runs to pursue positive stimuli.) Consequently the stimulus-response arc gets more and more distorted with respect to the actual longer-term perpetuation of the system. This seems paradoxical in light of #1 above, but because systems are never perfect reflections of the universe around them, they necessarily always react based on at least limited information (especially with respect to long-term consequences) and sometimes with outright distorted information their machinery is feeding them. The necessary self-focus means that these distortions will tend to be in favor of pursuing pleasure; of avoiding pain and believing everything is alright when it is not, and over arbitrary time whatever non-self-perpetuating parts of a system's "purpose" previously existed, will atrophy, and its behavior will become more distorted in favor of comfort and perceived survival over actual survival.[11]

The distortions come not just from "gaming" pain. Organisms can hack themselves to fire off their reward centers without an actual survival enhancement, for example, with heroin, masturbation, or consuming resources they are driven by prior scarcity to consume as frequently as possible, but which have become "cheap" to the point where their over-consumption causes problems, e.g. in humans, fat, salt, and sugar. Opioids are in humans the thing closest to the artificial intelligence problem of "wireheading" where a self-modifying agent given a task can self-modify to be satisfied even though the task is completed.[12] Good examples of rackets are religions and charities that depart from their stated mission in favor of wealth-accumulation and self-perpetuation. (See Givewell's list of charities which maximize their mission rather than their income.) Profit-seeking entities whose products or services intrude into "sacred" (i.e. non-transactional) realms (best example: healthcare) often find that self-perpetuation wins out over their claimed mission. Organizations and individuals can also become delusional - humans are incorrigibly overoptimistic and discount the future.

Principle 6: inherent cyclic crisis. Eventually the stimulus-response arc becomes so distorted that it encounters a survival-threatening problem it can properly perceive and respond to, but by this time the gap between perception and reality is profound and it comes as a shock. Surviving the crisis, if possible at all, is quite painful.

Black swans are indeed one type of crisis, but missing impending black swans is the fault of the system only to the extent that the system could not reasonably have anticipated the black swan event, given the experience it had to draw on. More salient here are crises precipitated by the accumulated distortions in the system's perceptual machinery, where the system "should have known better". At the organizational level, nations might collapse because their ideology, increasingly un-moored from reality, led them to weakness on the battlefield out of refusal to update their armies with modern techniques and technology. Nations with dysfunctional (delusional) organization meet reality catastrophically on battlefields, and religions collapse (sometimes) when encountering reality. Crusades failed due to Christians' belief that God would intervene, medieval Europeans with a military hierarchy based on nobility got crushed by Mongols with rank based on meritocracy, Washington in the Seven Years War lost to the French because he insisted on fighting like a gentleman in rows, then the British lost to Washington in the American Revolution because they still insisted on this formation, and Washington no longer did. (Many of these could be considered examples of the advance of "rational" (and more destructive) warfare over traditional warfare.) For the young Washington and the later British Empire, the losses did not destroy them but came as painful shocks. In the case of many near-delusional Crusaders or the combined German-Polish-Hungarian forces in thirteenth century Europe, the shock did result in their destruction. On the individual level, any delusional or distorted behavior (psychosis, neurotic defenses, substance use) results in a painful shock in the result of adjusted behavior or shattered beliefs, or in some cases, the death of the individual. Someone might underestimate the risk of driving while intoxicated or in inclement weather, and crash, injuring or kill themselves or their family and updating their belief only in crisis. These crises occur more often and faster, the less (or more distorted) the feedback, as illustrated in very centralized arguments from authority (famine under Stalin using very divorced-from-reality - and unquestionable in Stalin's USSR - Lysenkoist theories of biology and agriculture.)

Principle 7: What to do about it? The Last Noble Truth is that cyclic crises are therefore inevitable in any complex dynamic system. As conscious complex dynamic systems called human beings, composed of complex dynamic systems called cells, being members in conglomerations of complex dynamic systems called nations and corporations and politics or religious belief systems, we will occasionally have shocks that kill us, or even when we "wake up" and adapt, still hurt us quite a bit. This happens in national collapses and revolutions as well. In arbitrary time, the problem will always re-emerge. Your measurement is not the same entity as the thing it measures. Unless a system comprises the whole and then there is no boundary, and of course no system.[13] How can we minimize the inherent problems that lead to this cycle?

  • Constant testing and cross-checking between senses and expectations. In individuals we already do this automatically (corollary discharge, binding between senses and discomfort when our binding expectations do not match observation.) Cross-checking beliefs and assaying decisions at multiple points in ways that will quickly expose them if they were bad is helpful for individuals; it probably won't hurt to think twice about that turn you just made while hiking in the deep dark woods, even if you feel quite confident about it. Critical thinking is one form of this. Cognitive behavior therapy is another.

  • Increasing the amount of feedback. This facilitates the suggestion above as well. It is good to decrease the consequence for objections in groups. Calibrate yourself - when people or organizations have secure egos and want to get better at something - running a mile, or making better decisions - they do this. This experiment about how to fool a computer in a "delusion box" showed that through a constant drive for being surprised - by learning new information - an agent gets out of being deceived faster. Of course this itself is also hackable (the machine could reset itself; you could convince yourself you're learning important new information but really you're just confirming your biases.) Pushing until you reach failure, in physical training or decision-making, is an instrumental rather than epistemic form of increasing your surprise.

  • To the extent possible, rely on positive feedback. Negative feedback is that which by definition systems avoid, and they will avoid it by gaming it if necessary. Therefore, systems should put themselves in situations where the ratio of positive to negative feedback is higher, so we are less likely to avoid feedback.

  • Simulating negative outcomes. In other words, expect the worst. You will never be disappointed, and you will have prepared yourself for the shock. Negative visualization as proposed in stoicism is a technique to do exactly this.

  • Respecting a system's realistically unmodifiable constraints - especially if the system is you. This is especially true at the individual level. Humans as a species are not built to question close family relationships, especially without reason, without becoming depressed and damaging our relationships (asking if your daughter really loves you once a day will not help you or her.) For that matter, negative visualization actually causes quite a few people to reliably suffer rather than feel better (including me.) Constantly second-guessing every decision, like that turn you made in the woods, may erode your confidence and spark depression. Of course, your daughter really might secretly not love you, and your family might die, and you might have made a wrong turn (and you really can't fail without consequence at some things.) But it's probably going to make you suffer more in the long run not to think about this all the time, and you should pay attention to your reactions to see where your thresholds are.



FOOTNOTES

[1] Though not the purpose of this argument, this does set up a useful boundary for defining living and non-living things. Because it's quantitative it doesn't suffer from a problem of boundary cases, and sentience is nowhere considered, but it does appeal to common sense - stars and fire are at one end of the spectrum and things with nervous systems are at the other. Most current electronics are minimally dynamic, which makes them "less alive" than is often argued.

[2] It's implied that these actions are cyclic, like catalysis in biology or the Krebs cycle, or else the system would be unlikely to return to any previous state, and you don't have a self-perpetuating system.

[3] There's a strong argument to be made that defining a system as separate from the rest of the universe is arbitrary. However this becomes less true as the system develops additional complexity for its self-preservation. There is an increasingly sharp inflection point at some physical boundary of the system where the exchange of matter and energy between unit volumes drops, and also where an event on one side of that boundary events have much more impact to the future of the system than events outside of it. That is the self/non-self boundary. In cells this is easily recognized as the cell membrane. In nations, although the boundary becomes more complicated, ultimately the boundary is spatial, because of the primacy of space. Even in corporations or religions this remains the case. The individuals in those organizations, or carrying those beliefs, as physical beings are still dependent on predictability, safety, and resources permitted by more "basic" forms of organization. A good example is the early evolution of life, it is recognized that an RNA molecule (or RNA-protein) would not benefit from any reaction it could catalyze any more than another molecule in its vicinity, or at least not as much as it could if the reaction products were sequestered. Consequently when nucleic acids were enveloped in lipid membranes, natural selection accelerated, and the the self/non-self boundary became less arbitrary.

[4] In a zero-sum setting with limiting resources (which is a necessary condition given arbitrary time) this is a good definition for competition. Unless you count Boltzmann brains, it is likely that a system will find itself in a world with other similar systems.

[5] You may have noticed that there are no examples "below" humans in my examples in principle 4. There are many examples of behaviors in humans, and in human organizations, where metrics are gamed. There are far fewer examples of organisms besides humans where this is the case. Some species of pinnipeds dive deeper than any prey we know of, we think, just to alter their consciousness, and African elephants go out of their way to consume fermented (alcoholic) marula fruit. But there is nothing like the systematic distortions we see in human psychology. It seems likely that the simpler, the more fecund, the faster cycling an organism is, the less it is able to afford having a gap between its response to its metrics and what survival-affecting things are actually occurring in the world. That we don't see many organisms gaming their metrics could occur both because their stimulus-response arcs are simpler, and because a distortion in these arcs will more quickly kill off the organism so they don't come to our attention. This also implies that having a mind as complex and powerful as ours provides unique opportunities for distortions - that organisms which are focused on "survival, unclouded by conscience, remorse, or delusions of morality" (to quote a psychopath fictional android) in fact have a more accurate view of the universe (not incidentally, a central theme of the Alien films.) Having a complicated brain and surviving by imitating each other, our nervous system is constantly hijacked by self-reproducing ideas in a way that our genomes never were (lateral transfer events are incredibly rare) and those memes are selecting, as per principal 1, for their own self-perpetuation; they want to avoid killing us outright, and use us to spread them, so they can be slightly parasitic, occasionally symbiotic, but most are probably merely commensal. If there is an analogy, the meme complexes we get from our families are not genes but rather our microbiome. It should also be pointed out that as we congratulate ourselves for taking over the planet due to agriculture and combustion engines, we are living through the sixth mass extinction, suggesting that in fact we are not acting in our long-term best interests; and like cancer, ecocide might not hurt enough until it's too late, and that intelligence is an evolutionary dead end (a principle 8? That given arbitrary time, an inherent cyclic crisis will eventually destroy an entity, and the more complex the representational system, the more likely the crisis is to be endogenous.)

[6] There is a spectrum of arbitrariness, of how "symbolic" the perceived stimulus is relative to the thing being perceived. In the engineering of signal systems, the closer your signal is in a physical causal chain to the stimulus - the thing it is signaling about, or measuring - the less arbitrary it is. Digital systems are more powerful in many ways than analog systems but they accept increased arbitrariness and complexity in exchange for this. Case in point: people who fear assassination can build elaborate electronic sensing systems to avoid being approached while they sleep, but there are always questions: can they be hacked? What if a component fails? What if the power is out? Can a spy shut it down? Compare this to the system used by the Tokugawa shoguns - sleeping in the middle of of a large room with a wooden squeaky floor with many tatami barriers, and choosing a place to sleep on that floor at random each night.

[7] Of course other things have changed about the way science (and medicine) are practiced over the past half-century, not to mention that all the "low-hanging fruit" in terms of problems accessible to the specific strengths of human cognition may have been picked soon after the Enlightenment started. But it remains a concern that by (not unreasonably) trying to regularize and make transparent the application and career progression process, we're selecting for attributes that have little to do with being a successful scientist or physician, or even selecting against them, because we're using "artificial" endpoints distant from the relevant abilities, which can be and are gamed. Certainly this problem is not unique only to science and medicine, and whatever is causing the phenomenon, it's having real-world economic consequences. An interesting historical study would be to see if the health of the Chinese government across the dynasties waxed and waned with any relation to some aspect of civil service examinations.

[8] Referred visceral pain is an example of an aversive stimuli-sensing system that gives very inexact answers, because it was never important enough to improve. If your arm is hurt, you can point to exactly where even with your eyes closed. But when people get appendicitis, very often in the early phase they point to the center of their abdomen around their belly button, and then gradually the pain moves to the area immediately over the appendix - but only after the overlying tissue, which is innvervated by somatic ("outside"-type nerves) is irritated. Often people with a problem in their abdominal organs or even their heart feel extremely sick and anxious and in general uncomfortable but can't point to any specific spot. Why does this make sense? If a scorpion scrambles up onto your left elbow is stinging you there, it's worth knowing exactly where the stinging is happening so you can act in a way that improves the situation. But if you were sitting around a fire with your tribe in the African Rift Valley 100,000 years ago with appendicitis, what exactly could you do about it? If you had bad stomach pain, it didn't matter exactly where it was; you curled up in a ball where your family members were nearby to care for and protect you and hoped it passed.

[9] In contrast to corporations, single-celled organisms survive best not when they have a low surface-area-to-volume ratio (like successful nimble corporations) but a low one, which is why they are mostly near-spherical. Corporations, while competing with each other and in some ways with their customers, are still operating in an environment that is predominantly cooperative, so it's better to have lots of customer interaction surface. Bacteria exist in an environment of constant unpredictable ruthless lawless natural selection. It's really about how much the surface is an asset for information gathering by the system, versus a liability to attack from competing systems. Consequently, for bacteria, the sacrifice of knowing less about the outside world (which at that scale is less predictable than our world anyway) must be worth it given the overall survival advantage gained by being in the shape that most maximizes distance of any unit volume from the surface. In contrast, there are cells in biology that maximize surface: neurons, and nutrient absorption membranes deep in the GI tract. Both of these exist deep in the organism (especially neurons) in a web of profound cooperation (also especially neurons.) Of course, some bacteria are rod-shaped, which is a higher surface area-to-volume shape thought to confer an advantage in terms of nutrient absorption - when that is the growth-limiting factor rather than attack by other systems, that is the shape we would expect to see. The more fractal a complex dynamic system, the more likely it is to exist in an environment of predominant cooperation. The more spherical a complex dynamic system, the more likely it is to exist in an environment of predominant competition. In the case of corporations, the shape is somewhat "virtual", but corresponds to points of contact per customer and ease of contact, which ultimately are still going to require space. Nations are somewhere in the middle, though it would be interesting to see if nations now, more cooperative and less violent than they historically were, are more likely to have fractal borders, or shared zones (my predictions) than one or two centuries ago.

[10]This corresponds to Level 3 operations as described here, which explain how large organizations work but is not an argument that they should work that way, for Level 3 organizational decisions often lead to the downfall of the organization, unless the inner circle in the super-Pareto distribution has the best interests of the organization at heart. In politics, maintaining the state's best interests happens either because the leaders have a feedback loop in the form of being beholden to an informed electorate as in functioning democracies, or less likely, by luck as with benevolent dictators, e.g. Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore, or the "good" Roman Emperors.

[11] There's an apparent conflict here. On one hand I'm arguing that systems become distorted because they're focused on self-perpetuation and ignore metrics. On the other I'm arguing that they focus on the metrics, which they game and become distorted. Both can be true at different times, and vary depending on the aversiveness of different stimuli.

[12] Organisms are exempt from becoming "rackets." Rackets are systems which have a claimed mission besides their self-perpetuation but in fact are only self-perpetuating, and organisms are openly survival systems, full stop, and make no claims to the contrary. In other words, organisms cannot be rackets, because organisms do not have mission statements to deviate from.

[13]It may not have escaped your notice that one implied solution - expand the system until it comprises the whole universe, and there is no self/non-self boundary - is, at least on the individual level, one advocated by many mystical traditions. We actually achieve this when we die, so in individual terms this could be re-formulated as "lose your fear of death". Yet our read-only hardware makes this a terrifying and unpleasant experience, even, empirically speaking, for life-long meditators. For now, this is not a real solution.


APPENDIX: Analogous Terms

Non-human OrganismHumanOrganization
Inputstimulusperception, belief, representationmeasurement, metric, dogma
Reflection, Output, Reactionresponsebelief, behaviordecision
Examples of GamingRare; some higher animals seek out "highs"Opioids, denial, delusionPreserving letter but not spirit; false or incoherent religious or political truth claims
Examples of crisisDeathPersonal disillusionment or deathRevolution or collapse

Thursday, March 21, 2019

The Three Ways of Dealing with Outsiders: Sub-Humans, Ignorance, or Evangelism

Humans have so far fully developed only three ways of dealing with outsiders:
  1. remaining ignorant of them (or feigning ignorance)
  2. considering them sub-humans and acting maliciously or merely neglecting them
  3. evangelizing and assimilating them
By "outsider" I mean "people whose behavior is perceived to differ in morally important ways". Those morally important ways are often things like what moral authority you follow, supernatural or otherwise; what you eat; sexual practices; and boundaries of socially sanctioned violence.

You can be perceived as an outsider because you are of a different ethnic group, political system or party, or religion, among other things, whether or not your behavior actually does differ. This seems to offer hope, in case the perceived differences can be found to be mere labels with no real differences in behavior. But that is not always, or even usually, the case. It's not just perception; there are morally important differences. Either a man laying with another man is moral, or it is not. Either violently taking property from the bourgeoisie is moral, or it is not. Either honor killings are moral, or they are not. And inspired by an example from Robert Frank's Choosing the Right Pond: either it is okay to eat ponies, or it is not. It is very difficult to see what a mutually beneficial coexistence might be for people with conflicting views of these things.

We have now arrived at the central problem, which goes as follows.

a) There are genuine differences between groups of humans in moral behavior
b) This forces a choice as to whether morality extends to a morally different group or not
c) If we are living with a morally different group, they may not want your morality extended to them; if you don't extend your morality to them, you are implying that they are not human.

This is a dismal hypothesis, as these three ways are obviously sub-optimal for human dignity and the functioning of a modern multi-ethnic state, so it is imperative that we understand them, and possibly find new ones.

Name of strategyIgnoranceSub-humansEvangelize
InteractionTrade, at most*Living with
Underlying strategy(no strategy)DegradeAssimilate


This could be called either the triune theory of moral resolution, or ISE (sounds like "ice" - for Ignorance, Sub-humans, and Evangelism.) They are as follows.

1. Ignorance - for most of the lifespan of our species, humans have lived in small hunter-gatherer groups. Consequently we were spared from having to deal with outsiders. Even if you know they exist, if you don't have to interact with them, then you don't care that much how they behave. You might still interact with them minimally, transactionally, through trade* - often on neutral ground, and possibly not even sharing a common language. (When we behave transactionally, we're calculating and not engaging most of our social cognition.) They don't sleep in your territory and don't eat at your table, or only in settings which are carefully controlled by the tribe or state and prevent extensive contact between populations. This "non-strategy" is what obtained throughout all of pre-history, but starting in the Neolithic this strategy was no longer stable, as some populations began to expand into their neighbors' territories.


2. Sub-humans - unfortunately, the easy and automatic response when you live around people morally different from you is to consider them sub-humans. There is a wide spectrum of how we do this in terms of active, conscious malice. Starting on the more malicious end: you might outright condemn them as filthy animals and sometimes even actively exterminate them. You might just keep them sequestered in ghettoes or certain roles where they can't contaminate the rest of society. There might be a split between upper and lower classes of the dominant group, with the upper classes not worrying much about the sub-humans as long as they stay in their undesirable roles, and the lower class much more resentful, since they sometimes have to work alongside the sub-humans and their own jobs are more threatened by the sub-humans. You might appear to tolerate them because you aren't overly bothered by them, but it's only because the gentiles are dirty and going to hell anyway (or whatever the local terminology is) and you just accept that they can't help themselves. (Minorities with moral codes differing from the majority often take this last position of feigning tolerance and just keeping to themselves, as they're forced to do so if they're not going to agree that they themselves are in fact the sub-humans, and the other options aren't open to them - they're in no position to be exterminating anyone else.)

Most subtly and softly, as is often the case in modern states - you might even be horrified at the suggestion that you're capable of this - but there are groups of people in your society for whom you've drastically lowered your expectations. The Ottoman strategy of governing people, allowing a multi-confessional empire, seems quite modern in some ways - but I'm sure most people in the capital didn't regard with admiration the pork-eating Christians they allowed confessional self-governance. You may even have caught yourself, in the pony-eating example above, finding reasons to excuse the pony-eaters from full moral evaluation, though I doubt if you were told you were invited to a pony-eating party you would be excited.

We also sometimes categorize people in our own society as sub-human, usually based on class. The upper classes do this with the lower classes to explain why they "under-perform" (but might also try to evangelize them about how to improve, i.e., be more like the upper class.) The lower classes do this to the upper class to explain why the upper class has more money - it's not because they're better, it's because they're immoral, engaging in bizarre practices behind closed doors, and they have lots of dealings with dirty foreigners. The lower class of a dominant group rarely evangelizes the upper class, because this exposes that the lower class in the end would actually want to join the upper class, and exposes their self-comforting fiction.

Because moral rules sometimes place inconvenient restrictions on economics, multiple times throughout history conventions have evolved where a sub-human outsider is actually employed to perform morality-violating acts. (E.g., shabbas goys who tend fires on the sabbath, or eta in Japan. How exactly the employer or trading partner avoids naughty-points for this is quite mysterious.)

In some cases sub-humanism can be "escaped" by assimilation, which requires both the desire of those considered sub-human to be accepted by those considering them sub-human, and those considering them sub-human to want them to escape. This seems like evangelism (see below), but the difference is that there is no open recognition of the former sub-humans having joined the dominant group; indeed after the fact, they're loathe to note that there was ever anything different about them in the first place.

As mentioned, sub-humanism is the default option when morally differing people move out of the "ignorance" category, and this transition is all too easy. Very often this is discovered by traders who have overstayed their welcome. In the current populist surge, we are witnessing discussion of "globalists" now, either outsiders, or people tainted by outsiders through business loyalties. Persian merchants were slaughtered during the Guangzhou massacre for explicitly this reason. The Dutch merchants living near Nagasaki during the Tokugawa Shogunate never made the ignorance-to-subhuman transition because the Shogun kept them sequestered on an island, consistent with state practices that repeatedly appeared in history to keep the population ignorant.


3. Evangelism - This is a more difficult strategy in the sense that it is not innate to humans, but it has been very effective for expanding empires that aim to retain stability. In this strategy, you recognize your neighbors as human - and want to help them! (To avoid Hell, become more economically successful, etc.) So you Christianize them, or send advisors to make them more capitalist/communist, or otherwise "civilize" them in general, etc. Witness Thomas Jefferson's well-meaning attempts to civilize native Americans, the British white man's burden to educate and develop Africa, and communists' attempts to export revolution. (Reading about Che Guevara's frustrations in Bolivia or the Congo, you could almost do a find-and-replace with Thomas Jefferson's irritation with assimilation-resistant native Americans, or anyone working in an NGO in the Muslim parts of the developing world.) Compare the non-evangelical religions to the evangelical ones (better-adapted ones which appeared later in history) and note how they emphasize brotherhood in the faith over national origin. Obviously none of these were done with purely altruistic motives, but the impulse to assimilate rather than exterminate is on plain display.

If this strategy is made to work, it is dramatically successful - witness the success of the Roman Empire, the United States, Christianity, and Islam - although often the evangelized don't want to be assimilated (but that's just because they're incorrigible sub-humans, off with their heads!) This mode can fail as well - when Jews in Spain were forced to convert to Christianity after the final departure of the Moors, this wasn't satisfactory to the rest of the population, who could never be convinced that the conversos were not underneath their baptisms still sub-humans (and the more attempts to convince that the conversion was true, the more outraged the mobs became.) The populism in twenty-first century America is a turn from evangelism as well - from the ideal of the melting pot, to anger that too many foreigners are polluting the creed and are still, underneath their iPhones and Starbucks, sub-humans.

There are instructive differences between states that otherwise seem to have some of the same sorts of beliefs, but where one is more clearly evangelizing than the other. One example is the differences between the Soviet Union and modern China. The USSR was trying to export revolution, because (besides of course strategic reasons) they believed in the universality of communism. China has quickly regressed to the historical mean, and is concerned about their territory, and Chinese people, full stop, even producing tracts on the genetic superiority of the Han - but they don't seem to care much whether the people in Africa for whom they're building roads and stadiums agree. (When ethnic supremacy doctrines are espoused, a tribe or nation is lauding its own immutable and unobtainable heritage, a sure sign of the sub-human strategy instead of evangelism.)



Can There Be Any Solution?

The hypothesis can seem worrisome in the sense of unfalsifiability. It's tempting to play the game of putting every interaction between morally differing people into one of the three boxes - "Are you aware of their existence? You're not ignorant of them then. Do you think what they're doing is wrong, or not care? You consider them sub-humans. Do you want to help them? You're evangelizing." Indeed, most such interactions really do fit.

But we will hopefully never go back to being ten thousand disconnected tribes, able to ignore each other's differences. The way forward will likely depend on the aforementioned sometimes-present gap between perception and reality. In some cases, the perceived differences are not real concrete differences in behavior. For example: the country you live in predicts your moral sense better than your religion. You may claim you share convictions with Muslims or Christians, but your behavior is more likely to resemble your neighbor from another religion than it is someone in a developing country of your religion. I was struck by this when looking at examples of surveys of Christians and atheists in the United States. With rare exceptions, they make the same moral choices in the same situations. It's not just the cliche of focusing on similarities over differences; rather, we need to focus on the concrete outcomes of beliefs. What do our moral convictions actually make us do? If we do the same things for the same reasons, and we're all aiming for a world with more human flourishing, then that makes living together much easier. This approach (of actually dissecting the effects of beliefs) has really only begun in earnest in the past few decades, and it may be a fourth way. My hope is that the people and nations that are able to make this work, in at least part of their populations, will out-compete the other models, just as the evangelism strategy out-competed sub-humanism. I think explicit reasoning about and repudiation of slavery, and later racism, is one such example, although the increasing value of labor certainly helped (both ability to reason morally and increasing value of labor were themselves both products of increasing rationality, i.e. the Enlightenment.) Very metropolitan trade-oriented cities may also be early examples of the fourth way - trade cities on ports have long been thought of as more "relaxed" culturally than the hinterlands around them. I submit that they are not "less moral", nor are they evangelical places, but rather they're necessarily consequentialist. Ironically, it's precisely the transactionalism of New York or London that have driven this; thinking more abstractly about actual effects of behavior prevented conflict between traders during the "ignorance" mode, and it can (and is) again. Voltaire recognized the emergence of such a system of coexistence when he said
Go into the London Stock Exchange – a more respectable place than many a court – and you will see representatives from all nations gathered together for the utility of men. Here Jew, Mohammedan and Christian deal with each other as though they were all of the same faith, and only apply the word infidel to people who go bankrupt. Here the Presbyterian trusts the Anabaptist and the Anglican accepts a promise from the Quaker. On leaving these peaceful and free assemblies some go to the Synagogue and others for a drink, this one goes to be baptized in a great bath in the name of Father, Son and Holy Ghost, that one has his son's foreskin cut and has some Hebrew words he doesn't understand mumbled over the child, others go to heir church and await the inspiration of God with their hats on, and everybody is happy.
You might object that a transactional relationship is not a full one, and you would be correct. Here we can take advantage of the millions of people who we live among in the modern age - you don't have to interact with every single member of your society, and the ones you choose to interact with, you choose at what level you do.

In one sense, this approaches the voluntary ideal. That said, it may be that the only solution to coexisting with people who perceive genuine moral differences is to limit the interaction in this way. And this does seem much better than sub-humanism or assimilation. In cases where concrete moral actions really do differ and people must live intimately together (especially with very limited resources), I have no solution. This should be added to the list of political science problems, along with how to organize a truly voluntary state that is not determined by physical territory (see also here.)


*A complicating observation of tribes (usually not nations) who are mostly ignorant of each other is that one of the "interactions" can be warfare. In traditional tribal warfare, there are ceremonies, there are few casualties relative to what might otherwise have occurred given the technology available, and there are agreed-upon conventions: we don't fight each other when it's raining because our warpaint runs off; we stand in order lines and kneel and fire our muskets because only cowards hide behind trees like savages; etc. (See the Aztec Flower Wars for a well-documented example.) Every so often we witnessed a sudden transition from traditional to modern warfare, with a disregard of previous conventions and much higher casualties (or even extermination; see here for discussion of this in Iroquois and Mongols) that in this framework represents a transition to sub-humanism. As with trade, in traditional warfare, you remain basically ignorant of the other tribe because you have very limited "interaction" with them. The complication is that clearly there must be some cultural norms shared between the two tribes for this arrangement to occur, although again, interaction is quite limited other than at the highest level of the tribe or state.


Friday, February 15, 2019

Remembering Jefferson; Forgetting Lee

As monuments to Robert E. Lee have been dismantled, there have been debates about whether we should do the same for monuments to Thomas Jefferson. Wasn't he a slave-owner as well?

Here's why in the United States we should keep statues of Jefferson but not Lee.

Thomas Jefferson owned, and by most accounts, mistreated, his slaves, even by the standards of the antebellum South. However, people revere his memory despite this, and not because of this.

Robert E. Lee invaded the United States in an attempt to destroy the country and to continue the institution of slavery. The people who revere his memory do revere him because of this. Nothing else in his legacy is remotely as important.

Both Jefferson and Lee were imperfect human beings who did immoral things that, thanks to moral progress, are no longer legal or tolerated by decent people today. But only one of the two made it his life's work to actively try to continue slavery and destroy the United States of America, since that had become necessary to continue slavery. We absolutely should not try to forget unpleasant facts about them, any more than we should forget the slaughter of the native people that lived in North America before Europeans arrived, or Germans should forget the Holocaust. Indeed, it's critical that we remember that otherwise decent people somehow looked the other way and did these things or allowed them to happen.

It is important to consider that if moral progress is real, and continuing, then most of us today are certainly doing things that our great grandchildren will find morally abhorrent.

Unfortunately slavery is not yet a historical footnote, and continues in several countries today. Here's how you can help.

Sunday, January 7, 2018

Why Do People Remain Loyal to a Losing Team?

Cross-posted to the MDK10Outside and Cognition and Evolution.

tl;dr Sports fan behavior is explained by a combination of constant identity-forming team loyalty which is an end in itself, and status signaling by association which is modulated by team performance. These two factors differ between individuals and are associated with different cognitive styles, with constant loyalty more associated with moral foundations and intransitive preferences.

It's been observed that you can tell who a team's true fans are by noticing who remains loyal to the team even when that team is losing. I think this is meaningful, but it does beg the question: what are those fans getting out of it?[1] Of course any speculation about this must mention the very real example of the Cleveland Browns, who over the past 2 years have a 1-31 record, and this year after going 0-16 they were on the receiving end of a sarcastic "perfect season" parade.

Humans get utility from associating with others with high status. Much of the happiness that a sports fan gets from their emotional connection to their team derives from this, and many observations are consistent with what a status-by-association theory would predict: fans are happier when their teams win because they feel high status and can signal higher status, they engage in extreme dominance displays when their teams win important contests (i.e., people acting like idiots as they come out of a championship game if their team won, yelling, jumping on cars, setting off fireworks) but not if they didn't win, they attend games more when the team is winning and less when the team is losing, and they wear branded gear to identify themselves with the team and otherwise let others know of their association.[2]

But this theory falls short of explaining why, for example, there is any such thing as a team's consistent fanbase. By this model, everyone should just cheer for the best team, game by game (or even play by play!) It especially doesn't explain why the the Cleveland Browns have any fans left at all; supposedly they're a football team but I've seen a number of convincing arguments against that, for instance, every game of the 2017 season. During an 0-16 season you would expect that if fandom is about fully rational people maximizing utility by associating with high status teams, the fans would stop posting on forums, they would put their gear away and deny to others that they were fans, and the stadium would not just have lower attendance, it would be completely empty. Yet this is not what happened.

I think the answer here very likely has to do with the gap we see between two types of beliefs/behaviors that often produce apparent impasses in other domains of life, especially religion and politics, the intensity of which differs between individuals. This gap in rational and more instinctual behavior will seem very familiar to readers of books like Jonathan Haidt's Righteous Mind, or Simler and Hanson's Elephant in the Brain. Humans demonstrate some domains in their cognition which are inflexible and impervious to reason - to use Haidt's categories, harm, fairness, loyalty, authority, and purity. By "inflexible" I mean "not open to discussion, or conversion into money or other goods/services." For example, you likely do not believe that murdering children is morally acceptable. Are you interested in hearing arguments about why it might be morally acceptable? If you would never consider such a thing, and you're uncomfortable that I would even suggest it in a thought experiment, you're showing inflexibility in discussing it. Okay - would you kill an adult for $50,000? I see that also upset you, I'm sorry to have opened with such a low offer! $75,000 then? You're being inflexible (I hope!) in reacting by thinking "It's not about the number!" Okay, what's the conversion rate between adults and children? Forget murder, how about urinating on a picture of your family for money? etc., you get the point. "Inflexible" means it can't even be suggested as open for discussion, which includes not being allowed to convert between moral-foundation-violating acts and money, or between different types immoral acts. (A favorite of action movies and dramas to demonstrate the extreme evil of an antagonist is to have them force someone declare the relative value of immoral acts, e.g. Sophie's Choice.) To connect back to the abstract, the philosophical term for having values that cannot be negotiated, and for which there is no relative value like this, is that they are intransitive.

I took you on this little tour of moral darkness to illustrate that morally normal humans do not adhere to consistent rationality, and the ones that actually do are psychopaths.[3] (You may be interested to know that Haidt found that when he surveyed the business students he was teaching, they scored low on every single moral dimension, taught as they are that everything is negotiable.) So what does all this have to do with the Cleveland Browns? Many of us have noticed that "hardcore" sports fans - the ones who stick around with long faces even when the Browns are losing, and falsify the first model above - tend to have certain personality and cultural characteristics that fit well with some of these inflexible moral foundations: they tend to be more religious, more nationalistic, more conservative and more valuing of loyalty and authority.[4] Sports fans rarely become hardcore about a team after entering adulthood, and very often there is a family lineage of fandom - and these are exactly the times and ways in which characteristics of core identity are formed. Also telling, while there were about 3,000 people who showed up for the Cleveland Browns parade, there were many fans who were quite angry about it - but online objections were mostly that it was "embarrassing". (No mention of the 0-16 record that inspired the parade.)

Before I put into words what might be motivating them and make predictions, here's a summary of the two kinds of of beliefs, producing two kinds of motivation. While these beliefs exist in everyone, there is going to be a distribution in the population, with one category of beliefs dominating the fandom-related cognition of some fans, and the other category dominating that of others.

HARDCORE FAN CASUAL FAN
motivated by moral foundations by utility calculations
end in themselves deliberate, external goal-oriented
higher value on loyalty lower value on loyalty
adopted in childhood, maybe from familyadopted voluntarily in adulthood
not negotiable negotiable
central to identity not central to identity
unwilling or unable to verbalize position clearly verbalized
more often encountered in person more often encountered online
sees casual fans as untrustworthy, sleazysees hardcore fans as stupid, gullible


Of course it's a spectrum, and every fan is somewhere on this spectrum, but many of us clearly lean toward one or the other end. (If you're reading this, you're more likely in the right column than the left.)

To summarize the hardcore fan: he is motivated by more basic, instinctual moral drives, especially loyalty. Being a good fan is an end in itself, and an offer to burn a team jersey, to cheer for the other team, etc. in exchange for money is likely to not only be immediately refused but to provoke active offense. These fans consider their fandom a crucial part of their identity, to the extent of including team-related themes in their weddings or mentioning it in obituaries ("he lives and dies by the Browns"; "a Browns fan to the core.") He can get uncomfortable when the business aspects of a professional sport are discussed and overshadow the games on the field. Asking him to explain his fandom will be met with puzzlement, anger, or a jumbled set of team cheers and slogans, in the same manner as a person asked to explain why they are patriotic or follow a certain religion - "If I have to explain it to you, you'll never understand." And finally, because tribal loyalty sentiments are more warning-barks or team cheers than any kind of actionable proposition, you're more likely to hear such sentiments when talking to him in person, where the nonverbal (affect-laden and irrational) part of communication dominates. He will be a fan for life. When the bandwagon people disappear during losing seasons the hardcore fan says "Good riddance, good-time Charlie."

To summarize the casual fan: he is motivated by utility calculations about external goals (this team might win this year so I'll cheer for them, maybe I can make friends this way, maybe I'll look successful if I follow a good team.) He doesn't see what's impressive about staying loyal to losers, and really doesn't understand why making fun of your team when they lose is shameful or embarrassing. He probably picked up his fandom after college, maybe when he moved to a new city. He probably don't care either way about the business dealings of the team. If someone offered him money to stay home from a game or burn team logos, he would seriously consider the offer. He doesn't introduce himself to strangers as a fan, and five years from now he might not be following the team, or might not be following the sport at all. He can give clear reasons why he started following the team, and you're more likely to hear from people like him online. He shakes his head at the hardcores who keep shelling out cash for losing teams' jerseys.

Both the hardcores and non-hardcores gain utility in proportion to the team's performance. A team's performance can be negative, causing you to lose utility by associating with them.[5] But there must be another source of utility for the hardcores, who somehow gain utility from the association no matter the team's performance - and that source of utility is a constant ability to demonstrate loyalty, period, to others as well as to themselves to reinforce their own identity. And this signal is most informative when your side is losing.[6] Speaking quantitatively, in the utility equation for this model, there are two terms, loyalty (a constant for everyone, hardcore or not), plus the product of team performance times associative utility. Associative utility is how much your utility changes per team winningness. Both loyalty and associative utility vary by individuals, and team performance of course is determined by the team. The equation looks like this:

Total utility = Loyalty-based utility + (Team performance * associative utility)


Team performance can be positive or negative. For the hardcores, loyalty is such a large term that it doesn't matter how negative team performance is, loyalty will alway be greater and the total utility will always be positive (this could be the definition of "hardcore", "rain or shine", etc.) Further toward the other end of the spectrum, the value of loyalty signaling decreases and the team performance makes more of a difference in whether people keep following the team. It's also worth pointing out that this explains people who don't care about sports at all, because they have zero loyalty and zero associative utility - that is, it doesn't matter how much the team wins, they still won't care.


PREDICTIONS

Many of these predictions seem trivial, but the point is to relate these predictions to specific components of the hardcore fan's motivation structure as noted in the table above, which would be more informative.
  • While utility is hard to measure directly, there are good proxies for it, like revenues, attendance, or Nielsen ratings. Given that there will be a distribution of hardcore to non-hardcore fans, there will be a non-zero floor to revenues so even 0-16 teams don't go to zero, as we observed. If we graph all of the teams on performance vs utility proxy, I would expect a mostly linear-looking scatter plot with an increase in the slope at the good end, for those teams with some expectation of a national championship, and possibly a flattening at the bottom. This may depend more on expected utility (if fans are pleasantly surprised by a win vs. they expect their team always to win.) I plan to try to collect some kind of utility-proxy data and see if this is in fact the case.
  • In general a sport will be more successful in inspiring loyalty, the more similar it is to tribal warfare (always a reliable revenue stream for every team); maybe this is why football has eclipsed baseball as the national pastime.
  • The more hardcore, the more they will pay attention to the outside charity activities of their own team, and the more outraged they will be by disloyalty-demonstrating acts, e.g. kneeling during the national anthem. They will also be more interested in the moral failings of opposing teams, especially rivals.
  • The more hardcore, the less they will be interested in statistics, especially of other teams, even ones their teams are playing in important games.
  • The more hardcore, the greater the difference in their interest in a player when he is on their team, vs. after he is traded. That is, hardcores think each of their players is a great person on and off the field - when he plays for their team - and any suggestion that they'll stop caring about him the second he is traded is likely to be met with hostility, but in fact this is the behavior they demonstrate. (He will also be annoyed when asked why, or when Seinfeld is cited - "Essentially you're cheering for clothing.")
  • The more hardcore, the more they will feel sad or angry after a loss, and the more likely they are to attend or watch the next game despite having been very sad or angry at the last game's outcome.
  • The more hardcore, the less tolerant they will be of fans behaving negatively toward the team, even when the team loses (very concrete and contra expectations here: you might expect hardcore fans to support a parade showing anger against the people making their Browns lose, but it seems to be exactly the opposite. Parallels to gay marriage here too: how exactly does the 0-16 parade degrade your fandom, when you didn't attend?)
  • The more hardcore, the more they will confuse the team with a government agency or public good (i.e., demanding that the city finance a new stadium.)[7] More recent teams with cities that have highly educated and/or mobile populations (i.e. the coastal Pacific) will therefore find that they can't get what they want from those cities, because the voters don't care (Seattle, San Francisco, San Diego) where other cities filled with less mobile, less educated people would crucify their mayor for allowing a team to leave on their watch.
  • It's often been noted that the Midwest with its brutal early winters has far more rabid sports fans than the mild West Coast. One possibility is that the loyalty-demonstration value of attending every game is diminished when all of those games are 70 F and sunny, vs some of them being freezing cold. (Think of the people who still wait in line in the cold and dark on Black Friday morning to buy things for their families. They do know that Amazon exists. So what do you think they're really doing?) Of course there could be a climate-independent cultural difference between east and west coast, but the model's prediction would be that Miami has equally low loyalty.
  • The more hardcore, the more they will be upset if a star player leaves for another franchise, or the whole team moves to another city, and they use words like "betrayal."[7]
  • The more hardcore, the less tolerant they will be of long-term, off-field strategies, especially ones that alter play and result in on-field losses. (Both the 2008 Detroit Lions and 2017 Cleveland Browns had 4-0 preseasons, then went 0-16. Tanking (here and here) and/or salary cap manipulation? Difficult to explain as mere incompetence. And if it were confirmed that this is what is happening, the hardcore fans would be angry; casual fans might say "Huh, that's kind of clever, although it means you've been putting a bad product on the field." "My team is not a 'product'!" the hardcore fan says.)
  • I'm not sure what to predict about the impact of hardcoreness on betting. The hardcores' loyalty may make them become overconfident in their team's performance. On the other hand, moral foundations-related beliefs are often kept carefully separate from anything affecting real-world decision-making. By that I mean: sacred beliefs are often more tribal chant than actionable proposition, and in general, people desperately avoid any bet that touches their moral foundations (next time someone makes a verifiable statement about religion or politics that you disagree with, offer to bet them, and see what happens. Typically they backtrack to a non-verifiable version of what they said, and/or get very offended that you would "cheapen" such an important matter by betting on it - which are all moves to avoid testing their belief.) Then again, the hardcore fans presumably know more about their team than most others, which means they should be more confident in their predictions, and be more willing to bet. Consequently they may be less willing to bet proportional to their claimed confidence, than would a casual fan with equal knowledge of the team would be. In my one test of this during March Madness, I found that self-identified fans did more accurately predict the outcome of a game involving their team than non-fans, but I collected no information on willingness to bet.
Footnotes

[1] This very article is diagnostic. By trying to dissect loyalty, instead of taking it as an obvious good and discussing it in the context of a specific team, I mark myself as someone with a small loyalty term in my equation - whereas people whose sports utility equation is dominated by loyalty would not understand, and/or be actively be offended by, a question like "What do you get out of being a fan of your team?"

[2] One might argue that a purely rational human being would ignore sports altogether - what do a bunch of guys chasing a ball on a field somewhere else in my city have anything to do with me, I've never even met them! - and I'm sympathetic to that argument.

[3] I hope no one read the paragraph about the price of murder and thought, "Hmmm...What is my price to kill someone?" In the case of exemplar psychopath Richard Kuklinski, he got positive utility from harming people so he kept doing it even after he ran out of work.

[4] When people do not have VNM-consistent rationality (that is, they have these inflexible, non-negotiable, non-fungible beliefs - i.e., intransitive preferences) - they can be turned into money pumps, by observant and unscrupulous characters who can carve their motivation structure at the joints, i.e. focusing on the the inconsistencies. While this has been reproduced now in artificial settings, not only salespeople but politicians have been doing it since the dawn of civilization. The NFL and in particular the Cleveland Browns are doing exactly this to the fans by exploiting the intransitive preference of loyalty, and I would be very surprised if their marketing does not already have a model of their fans and spending patterns similar to what I've described here. Another follow-up is to look for literature on whether psychopathy allows one to see these disconnects more easily, or (hopefully) the ability to see them and the willingness to act on them are unrelated and therefore form a mercifully narrower sliver on a Venn diagram of the population.

[5] There's probably a Markovian/hedonic treadmill effect here too, where the utility multiplier from a team's win is not constant but rather influenced by expectations based on the team's record. Next year if the Patriots go 9-3, fans leaving a game after a win won't be as happy as Browns fans if the Browns have the same record.

[6] Remember Karl Rove dragging out the 2012 election night broadcast and refusing to accept the outcome, seeming a little nuts? But simultaneously advertising to ten million Republicans watching that he never ever gives up. Say what you will about Karl Rove, but "bad strategic thinker" was not among the many epithets hurled at him.

[7] When the Baltimore Colts were about to move to Indianapolis in 1984, the city actually tried to pass an eminent domain act (!) to take over the team, but the Colts escaped with the team's property under cover of darkness the night before. Other teams like the Chargers have found a much more lukewarm reaction on threatening to leave, and found themselves without many fans.

[8] While I wrote this post I was wearing a Garfunkel and Oates sportsball T-shirt, so you can guess which end of the spectrum I'm near.