Monday, December 30, 2019

Ranking of University Attended Does Not Correlate Well With Adult Well-Being


More on this in a Q&A format in the post right above.

It's worth understanding the relationships between the multiple statistics about a university,[1] and with its output - that is to say, life satisfaction. There are numbers for average early career salary, but precious little on satisfaction: Forbes, for example, uses a very dubious metric of percentage of alums donating to a university, and how much they donate on average. (Dubious, because this likely has to do with the institution's proactivity in soliciting donations, as much as with alumni gratitude.) There is almost nothing on overall life satisfaction - which is curious, because this is the main output we're concerned with when we apply, or send our kids, to universities - isn't it? What I could find, strongly suggests that the differences in life outcomes caused by universities are minimal, if any; the strongest is a ~10% premium in income at the most selective institutions. But the only reason to care about money is because we think it would make us happier - and if it's not, which is what the few numbers we have are showing, why are we bothering with this?

It's scary to buck trends, especially for parents, in a way that you worry might damage your kid's future. Here's what I'm telling you, parents: you're causing your kids definite harm with the current get-into-college rat-race, for benefits which are at best slight, and maybe - probably - are entirely illusory. That is to say, you may well be taking away a happy childhood for nothing. When you tell your kids not to cave to peer pressure, set an example for them to follow. If you're not brave for them, no one else will be. If you go all-out in college admissions madness from preschool on, you owe it to your kids to know why you're really putting them through this. For their sake, I hope it isn't just because you're trying to win status points or avoid judgment from your family or neighbors or coworkers.

The most important conclusion is for stressed out kids and their stressed out parents: you will be fine. You will get in somewhere, and you will get a good education, and have a good life, and it will be fine. The ranking numbers are often based on very arbitrary decisions, cardinal rankings are not good bases for statistics because they often imply gigantic differences, and the makeup of the individual students is far and away the most informative driver of choice of university. Kids: try to get into the best school you can for what you're interested in, but don't kill yourself to do it, and don't despair if it doesn't happen - because it really doesn't make much of a difference. Also consider where you want to live, and what kind of people you want to date and be friends with for life.


FOONOTES

[1] If you're interested in relationships between those statistics, they're below. I have to emphasize, again, for something that causes so much stress and consumes so much time, when we choose colleges, we really don't know what we're buying. There is amazingly little literature on outcomes, which suggests that whatever is driving the college admissions Olympics, it's not how much getting into good college benefits our lives. Even though that seems absurd, it's also obviously true.

For the relationships between SAT, acceptance, and endowment size, here's how it came out. SATs are more closely correlated with the other two, about equally with both in fact. Endowment per student correlates markedly less well with selectivity.

  • SATs vs percent of applicants accepted: R^2 = 0.5896. The ones that are much more selective than their SATs would predict - the four military academies (which are obviously selecting on something besides SAT), followed by CUNY-Baruch and Babson College. The ones that benefit students - they are NOT as selective as SATs would predict - are Villanova, University of Maryland-College Park, and University of Minnesota-Twin Cities.

  • Endowment per student vs SATs: R^2 = 0.5711. I even chose a logarithmic curve, since the SAT approaches but cannot pass 1600, but it didn't improve the goodness of fit.

  • Endowment per student vs percent of applicants accepted: R^2 = 0.3388. The curve looked like endowment might have an increasingly marginal effect beyond $500,000/student, but even taking out the institutions above that or trying to fit exponentially or logarithmically didn't do much to the fit. The ones that are off-trend in a way that benefits students (lets higher amount of applicants in than their endowment would suggest) are Grinnell, Wellesley, University of Richmond, Texas Christian, and believe it or not Princeton. "Benefit" assumes that the endowment actually affects student experience.

[2] I had also been quite curious about the effect of nationally prominent athletic programs, especially football, on academic rankings. This is from personal experience, since I recall how the yield (% of accepted students actually matriculating) went up after Penn State's almost-number 1 1994 season. The Flutie Factor (cited in this paper by RT Baker, which was submitted to an academic institution but doesn't look like it's peer-reviewed) shows that the effect was known prior to that (the year after Doug Flutie won the Heisman, Boston College had a 25% increase in applications.) While there is very little literature about the effect of sports performance on academic ranking, this paper argues that in fact increasing football ranking does increase academic ranking.

Sunday, September 29, 2019

Complex Dynamic Systems Like Cells, Humans, and Nations Cannot Avoid Cycles of Paroxysmal Disillusionment and Suffering

The following principles apply to any dynamic complex system, including organisms, individual people, or organizations - corporations, nations, or religions. They demonstrate that distortions will inevitably accumulate in the behavior of such a system, causing paroxysmal shocks and suffering.

Let's define a system as a set of components discrete from the rest of the universe. Let's define dynamic complex systems as ones that are high-information relative to the rest of the universe around them, high enough that in the absence of opposing forces, entropy passively favors irreversible changes happening to the arrangement of the system's elements which make it no longer discrete.[1] If such a set of components that exists now is going to exist more-or-less unchanged in the future, it has to perform actions[2] - it has to be dynamic - which reduce its own entropy at the expense of the rest of the universe.[3] The rest of the universe may include similar systems.[4] (Going forward, when I say "system" I mean "complex dynamic system.")

The seven principles are outlined below, then described in more detail.

  1. A system must be mostly concerned with its own perpetuation, or it will not persist. "If a complex dynamic system has been around for a while, it's designed to last and expend energy to do so."

  2. It must do this by reflecting - reacting to - aspects of the rest of the universe. Aspects of the rest of the universe important enough to make the system tend to develop ways to change its state in response to them are called stimuli. A more familiar statement of this principle: "That which gets measured, gets addressed."

  3. A measurement always contains less information, and is therefore not a full or fully accurate representation, of the thing being measured. Perception cannot exactly be reality; "this is not a pipe."

  4. Over time, the focus on self-perpetuation leads a system to become concerned with itself to the point of minimizing the importance of or responses to aversive stimuli to avoid altering its state (which is also aversive.) "Everything that gets measured, eventually gets gamed" or "All metrics eventually become useless." (Also known as Goodhart's Law or Campbell's Law.)

  5. The system's responses become increasingly un-moored from the external world, favoring its own perpetuation over other functions, and/or having a severely distorted model of the world and reaction to stimuli. "Eventually, everything becomes a racket [and/or gets delusional]."

  6. The distortions accumulate until a sufficiently destructive stimulus occurs (a shock), which either reorients the system (usually accompanied by severe aversive stimuli), or destroys the system. If the system survives, such shocks will happen repeatedly, but necessarily unpredictably. This is called inherent cyclic crisis.

  7. This is inherent to any self-perpetuating dynamic complex system, and because these shocks are correctly perceived as worsening survival, they cause inevitable suffering. We can call this the Final Noble Truth, a vague parallel to the Buddhist First Noble Truth.


Following is an expansion on each principle.

Principle 1: "If a complex dynamic system has been around for a while, it's designed to last and expending energy to do so." If a system is going to continue existing, a top priority on self-preservation is mandatory, and self-preservation must be the primary influence on perception by and reactions of the system. Since Darwin, thinking of organisms in this way is not revolutionary. But the same principle applies to any other complex system, including human organizations. Corporations have a relatively clear function in this way (they can't keep making money for shareholders if they don't keep existing) but it's more surprising for most of us to think of religions, countries, or volunteer organizations in this way. The converse: if a complex dynamic system is not expending energy on its self-perpetuation, it will not exist for long. (Many apparent mysteries, like the transparently weak business plans of many a Web 1.0 company, are resolved on realizing that they are not in equilibrium and will perish quickly. And indeed they did.)

Principal 2: "What gets measured, gets addressed." This seems obvious enough, especially to those of us at all interested in organizational dynamics, but principal 1 directs the kinds of things that have to be measured if the system will persist, and principal 2 says that there is always some difference between the measurement, and the totality of the outside world; that is, there is always going to be at least some important information missed, and what is missed cannot be acted upon. Concretely speaking, genes reflect the outside world by establishing sensor networks that interact across the inflection point (the cell membrane, or in the case of multicellular organisms, the body.) Some sensor networks have become very rapid and fine-grained reflections of the outside world - xenobiotic metabolism enzymes (which have reacted in only millennia, and the genetics differ considerably even between groups of humans), adaptive immune systems (which also differ between groups of humans and react in minutes), and of course nervous systems are the paragon.[5] But all of them make sacrifices and do not (cannot) sample all of the possible information available. It should be pointed out that living things do not have to constantly repeat the mantra "what gets measured gets addressed" because that's how they're already built and behave, automatically and obligatorily, as was the case for eons' worth of their ancestors. This is not the case with human organizations, which are new developments in nature, and may not be in equilibrium - so those organizations that you notice do not measure important (survival-supporting) data are unlikely to exist for long either. Whatever corporations or their descendants exist in a million years, it won't be ones that didn't respond to relevant metrics. (Added later: A more generalized description of this process is called value capture, as described by philosophy professor C. Thi Nguyen at the University of Utah. Very briefly, value capture occurs when an individual encounters a group with a simplified, quantified version of their own values, often driven by considerations external to the agent. The additional component relative to "what gets measured gets addressed" is that in value capture, there is feedback from the simplified quantified value system to the individual, distorting and oversimplifying their own values.)

Principle 3: Perception cannot exactly be reality; "this is not a pipe." Representations - measurements - are never the same as the things themselves, and incentives are never aligned perfectly with desired outcomes (almost trivial; otherwise, perfect alignment means identity, that is, the incentives are the desired outcomes.) There must always be a limit on information collected, and inferences are not always correct. There is infinite information a system could in theory collect about the universe (looking for correlations between each datum or set of data), but the system is more likely to perpetuate itself the more the information it collects, and the more impactful the information it collects. It is this design choice by the system to sense survival-relevant data that turns one of infinite facts about the world around the system into a stimulus. Obviously, which things it chooses takes as stimuli - what it measures - are relevant. (Not to mention if the system is in competition, especially with others using the same resources, there are time and resource limitations on the system on how much data to collect before altering its state.) The implication is that there is a limited set of information collected out of all possible information - what the system receives as stimuli - and these stimuli are necessarily very heavily biased toward self-perpetuation.[6]

Principal 4: "Everything that gets measured, eventually gets gamed." This is similarly familiar, and here is where the tension is set up. Systems must perceive (measure) and react to their environment. Their measurements are not the same as the thing in the environment, only a reflection. Because of this, systems react to the measurement - the perception - not the thing that is being measured. This is not a trivial difference. Anyone who has worked at a large corporation or applied to professional school is familiar with this, and we all know examples where an endpoint was achieved in an only-technical, meaningless way that did not advance toward the real-world goal outside the organization that the endpoint was meant to incentivize. To "follow the letter but not the spirit" is an aphorism which expresses this. Case in point: many companies have sexual harassment or racial sensitivity training. These often take the form of instructional videos with quizzes after them. Most people skip and fast-forward through the videos as fast as possible to register as if they watched the whole thing, often having two different types of browsers open so when they get to the quiz they can go back if the answers aren't obvious. Of course this raises the question of whether there are some types of training where the written tests to get the credential have nothing to do with performing the actual work. For example, in the early-to-mid twentieth century, people became scientists because they liked being in labs, were good at organizing experiments, and in general got immediate feedback directly from their work, and therefore performed better, and therefore were recognized for it by peers and superiors, moreso than is the case now.[7] Do the best GRE scores (and administrative maneuvering, and recommendations, and tolerance of modern graduate school politics) really correlate with the best scientists? Or, does the same process produced skilled and caring physicians? (See Paul Graham's essay The Lesson to Unlearn.) For examples in individual humans, take your pick of any of a host of brain receptor-tricking molecules like opioids or alcohol, as well as immature psychological defenses like denial. Cancer is another example. Multicellular organisms have many checks on uncontrolled cell growth and spread, but there is a perverse natural selection our entire lives for cancer. Unlike infection or physical injury, cancer doesn't hurt until it's about to kill you, thanks to both the earlier reproduction of our ancestors relative to the later onset of cancer, along with the black swan of radiation and brand-new-to-nature chemicals that there was never any reason to develop an alarm system for.[5][8]

Another type of distortion has to do with the structure of the system, which effects the way it behaves, rather than perceptions per se. It's long been noticed that corporations become less "nimble" (responsive to market change; ie the relevant universe outside the corporation) as their surface area-to-volume ratio goes down.[9] The higher the surface area-to-volume ratio, the more information that can be collected and the more effective responses can be. Think of bloated giants like big automakers or old engineering companies, where in Dilbert-like fashion people think more about maneuvering in their jobs, coordinating with other departments within the company ("transfer pricing") or competing with other people within the company than they do about their outside-the-company competitors or serving the market. This certainly occurs within states as well, where to various extents for Chinese dynasties, the Roman Empire, and the Spanish colonial empire their downfall was more the result of special interest maneuvering and other intrigues directing attention consistent inward to the court - because what could be going on that's more important outside the palace walls where the barbarians are than inside where the power is? So we have Zheng He's fleet being recalled, Roman patricians scheming in the absence of a succession rule to get legions on your side, or Spanish royalty neglecting overseas possessions until the British and their offspring eat your lunch.[10] There's a final type of distortion which arises from the way that nervous systems save time and money: the more some stimulus-response pairing occurs, the less reward-sensitive it becomes. It moves from being a conscious act requiring effort and concentration, to a habit, to (in biology, programmed through evolution) a stereotyped movement, then a reflex. Once a stimulus-response pairing has started moving down the line it is almost impossible to move it back other than by over-writing it with another stimulus-response pairing.

Principle 5: "Eventually, everything becomes a racket [and/or gets delusional]." This quote is attributed to the late George Carlin. An occult paraphrasing of this in more specifically politics terms is "The state is primarily concerned with itself." Here we can see the full flowering of the problems buried in the earlier principles. There is a constant tension between the need for negative feedback, which the system avoids - that's what aversive stimuli are for - but because the measurement and the thing measured are not the same, the metric is game-able, and the system avoids these stimuli increasingly by gaming them rather than taking real action. (And simultaneously makes un-helpful-to-survival end-runs to pursue positive stimuli.) Consequently the stimulus-response arc gets more and more distorted with respect to the actual longer-term perpetuation of the system. This seems paradoxical in light of #1 above, but because systems are never perfect reflections of the universe around them, they necessarily always react based on at least limited information (especially with respect to long-term consequences) and sometimes with outright distorted information their machinery is feeding them. The necessary self-focus means that these distortions will tend to be in favor of pursuing pleasure; of avoiding pain and believing everything is alright when it is not, and over arbitrary time whatever non-self-perpetuating parts of a system's "purpose" previously existed, will atrophy, and its behavior will become more distorted in favor of comfort and perceived survival over actual survival.[11]

The distortions come not just from "gaming" pain. Organisms can hack themselves to fire off their reward centers without an actual survival enhancement, for example, with heroin, masturbation, or consuming resources they are driven by prior scarcity to consume as frequently as possible, but which have become "cheap" to the point where their over-consumption causes problems, e.g. in humans, fat, salt, and sugar. Opioids are in humans the thing closest to the artificial intelligence problem of "wireheading" where a self-modifying agent given a task can self-modify to be satisfied even though the task is completed.[12] Good examples of rackets are religions and charities that depart from their stated mission in favor of wealth-accumulation and self-perpetuation. (See Givewell's list of charities which maximize their mission rather than their income.) Profit-seeking entities whose products or services intrude into "sacred" (i.e. non-transactional) realms (best example: healthcare) often find that self-perpetuation wins out over their claimed mission. Organizations and individuals can also become delusional - humans are incorrigibly overoptimistic and discount the future.

Principle 6: inherent cyclic crisis. Eventually the stimulus-response arc becomes so distorted that it encounters a survival-threatening problem it can properly perceive and respond to, but by this time the gap between perception and reality is profound and it comes as a shock. Surviving the crisis, if possible at all, is quite painful.

Black swans are indeed one type of crisis, but missing impending black swans is the fault of the system only to the extent that the system could not reasonably have anticipated the black swan event, given the experience it had to draw on. More salient here are crises precipitated by the accumulated distortions in the system's perceptual machinery, where the system "should have known better". At the organizational level, nations might collapse because their ideology, increasingly un-moored from reality, led them to weakness on the battlefield out of refusal to update their armies with modern techniques and technology. Nations with dysfunctional (delusional) organization meet reality catastrophically on battlefields, and religions collapse (sometimes) when encountering reality. Crusades failed due to Christians' belief that God would intervene, medieval Europeans with a military hierarchy based on nobility got crushed by Mongols with rank based on meritocracy, Washington in the Seven Years War lost to the French because he insisted on fighting like a gentleman in rows, then the British lost to Washington in the American Revolution because they still insisted on this formation, and Washington no longer did. (Many of these could be considered examples of the advance of "rational" (and more destructive) warfare over traditional warfare.) For the young Washington and the later British Empire, the losses did not destroy them but came as painful shocks. In the case of many near-delusional Crusaders or the combined German-Polish-Hungarian forces in thirteenth century Europe, the shock did result in their destruction. On the individual level, any delusional or distorted behavior (psychosis, neurotic defenses, substance use) results in a painful shock in the result of adjusted behavior or shattered beliefs, or in some cases, the death of the individual. Someone might underestimate the risk of driving while intoxicated or in inclement weather, and crash, injuring or kill themselves or their family and updating their belief only in crisis. These crises occur more often and faster, the less (or more distorted) the feedback, as illustrated in very centralized arguments from authority (famine under Stalin using very divorced-from-reality - and unquestionable in Stalin's USSR - Lysenkoist theories of biology and agriculture.)

Principle 7: What to do about it? The Last Noble Truth is that cyclic crises are therefore inevitable in any complex dynamic system. As conscious complex dynamic systems called human beings, composed of complex dynamic systems called cells, being members in conglomerations of complex dynamic systems called nations and corporations and politics or religious belief systems, we will occasionally have shocks that kill us, or even when we "wake up" and adapt, still hurt us quite a bit. This happens in national collapses and revolutions as well. In arbitrary time, the problem will always re-emerge. Your measurement is not the same entity as the thing it measures. Unless a system comprises the whole and then there is no boundary, and of course no system.[13] How can we minimize the inherent problems that lead to this cycle?

  • Constant testing and cross-checking between senses and expectations. In individuals we already do this automatically (corollary discharge, binding between senses and discomfort when our binding expectations do not match observation.) Cross-checking beliefs and assaying decisions at multiple points in ways that will quickly expose them if they were bad is helpful for individuals; it probably won't hurt to think twice about that turn you just made while hiking in the deep dark woods, even if you feel quite confident about it. Critical thinking is one form of this. Cognitive behavior therapy is another.

  • Increasing the amount of feedback. This facilitates the suggestion above as well. It is good to decrease the consequence for objections in groups. Calibrate yourself - when people or organizations have secure egos and want to get better at something - running a mile, or making better decisions - they do this. This experiment about how to fool a computer in a "delusion box" showed that through a constant drive for being surprised - by learning new information - an agent gets out of being deceived faster. Of course this itself is also hackable (the machine could reset itself; you could convince yourself you're learning important new information but really you're just confirming your biases.) Pushing until you reach failure, in physical training or decision-making, is an instrumental rather than epistemic form of increasing your surprise.

  • To the extent possible, rely on positive feedback. Negative feedback is that which by definition systems avoid, and they will avoid it by gaming it if necessary. Therefore, systems should put themselves in situations where the ratio of positive to negative feedback is higher, so we are less likely to avoid feedback.

  • Simulating negative outcomes. In other words, expect the worst. You will never be disappointed, and you will have prepared yourself for the shock. Negative visualization as proposed in stoicism is a technique to do exactly this.

  • Respecting a system's realistically unmodifiable constraints - especially if the system is you. This is especially true at the individual level. Humans as a species are not built to question close family relationships, especially without reason, without becoming depressed and damaging our relationships (asking if your daughter really loves you once a day will not help you or her.) For that matter, negative visualization actually causes quite a few people to reliably suffer rather than feel better (including me.) Constantly second-guessing every decision, like that turn you made in the woods, may erode your confidence and spark depression. Of course, your daughter really might secretly not love you, and your family might die, and you might have made a wrong turn (and you really can't fail without consequence at some things.) But it's probably going to make you suffer more in the long run not to think about this all the time, and you should pay attention to your reactions to see where your thresholds are.



FOOTNOTES

[1] Though not the purpose of this argument, this does set up a useful boundary for defining living and non-living things. Because it's quantitative it doesn't suffer from a problem of boundary cases, and sentience is nowhere considered, but it does appeal to common sense - stars and fire are at one end of the spectrum and things with nervous systems are at the other. Most current electronics are minimally dynamic, which makes them "less alive" than is often argued.

[2] It's implied that these actions are cyclic, like catalysis in biology or the Krebs cycle, or else the system would be unlikely to return to any previous state, and you don't have a self-perpetuating system.

[3] There's a strong argument to be made that defining a system as separate from the rest of the universe is arbitrary. However this becomes less true as the system develops additional complexity for its self-preservation. There is an increasingly sharp inflection point at some physical boundary of the system where the exchange of matter and energy between unit volumes drops, and also where an event on one side of that boundary events have much more impact to the future of the system than events outside of it. That is the self/non-self boundary. In cells this is easily recognized as the cell membrane. In nations, although the boundary becomes more complicated, ultimately the boundary is spatial, because of the primacy of space. Even in corporations or religions this remains the case. The individuals in those organizations, or carrying those beliefs, as physical beings are still dependent on predictability, safety, and resources permitted by more "basic" forms of organization. A good example is the early evolution of life, it is recognized that an RNA molecule (or RNA-protein) would not benefit from any reaction it could catalyze any more than another molecule in its vicinity, or at least not as much as it could if the reaction products were sequestered. Consequently when nucleic acids were enveloped in lipid membranes, natural selection accelerated, and the the self/non-self boundary became less arbitrary.

[4] In a zero-sum setting with limiting resources (which is a necessary condition given arbitrary time) this is a good definition for competition. Unless you count Boltzmann brains, it is likely that a system will find itself in a world with other similar systems.

[5] You may have noticed that there are no examples "below" humans in my examples in principle 4. There are many examples of behaviors in humans, and in human organizations, where metrics are gamed. There are far fewer examples of organisms besides humans where this is the case. Some species of pinnipeds dive deeper than any prey we know of, we think, just to alter their consciousness, and African elephants go out of their way to consume fermented (alcoholic) marula fruit. But there is nothing like the systematic distortions we see in human psychology. It seems likely that the simpler, the more fecund, the faster cycling an organism is, the less it is able to afford having a gap between its response to its metrics and what survival-affecting things are actually occurring in the world. That we don't see many organisms gaming their metrics could occur both because their stimulus-response arcs are simpler, and because a distortion in these arcs will more quickly kill off the organism so they don't come to our attention. This also implies that having a mind as complex and powerful as ours provides unique opportunities for distortions - that organisms which are focused on "survival, unclouded by conscience, remorse, or delusions of morality" (to quote a psychopath fictional android) in fact have a more accurate view of the universe (not incidentally, a central theme of the Alien films.) Having a complicated brain and surviving by imitating each other, our nervous system is constantly hijacked by self-reproducing ideas in a way that our genomes never were (lateral transfer events are incredibly rare) and those memes are selecting, as per principal 1, for their own self-perpetuation; they want to avoid killing us outright, and use us to spread them, so they can be slightly parasitic, occasionally symbiotic, but most are probably merely commensal. If there is an analogy, the meme complexes we get from our families are not genes but rather our microbiome. It should also be pointed out that as we congratulate ourselves for taking over the planet due to agriculture and combustion engines, we are living through the sixth mass extinction, suggesting that in fact we are not acting in our long-term best interests; and like cancer, ecocide might not hurt enough until it's too late, and that intelligence is an evolutionary dead end (a principle 8? That given arbitrary time, an inherent cyclic crisis will eventually destroy an entity, and the more complex the representational system, the more likely the crisis is to be endogenous.)

[6] There is a spectrum of arbitrariness, of how "symbolic" the perceived stimulus is relative to the thing being perceived. In the engineering of signal systems, the closer your signal is in a physical causal chain to the stimulus - the thing it is signaling about, or measuring - the less arbitrary it is. Digital systems are more powerful in many ways than analog systems but they accept increased arbitrariness and complexity in exchange for this. Case in point: people who fear assassination can build elaborate electronic sensing systems to avoid being approached while they sleep, but there are always questions: can they be hacked? What if a component fails? What if the power is out? Can a spy shut it down? Compare this to the system used by the Tokugawa shoguns - sleeping in the middle of of a large room with a wooden squeaky floor with many tatami barriers, and choosing a place to sleep on that floor at random each night.

[7] Of course other things have changed about the way science (and medicine) are practiced over the past half-century, not to mention that all the "low-hanging fruit" in terms of problems accessible to the specific strengths of human cognition may have been picked soon after the Enlightenment started. But it remains a concern that by (not unreasonably) trying to regularize and make transparent the application and career progression process, we're selecting for attributes that have little to do with being a successful scientist or physician, or even selecting against them, because we're using "artificial" endpoints distant from the relevant abilities, which can be and are gamed. Certainly this problem is not unique only to science and medicine, and whatever is causing the phenomenon, it's having real-world economic consequences. An interesting historical study would be to see if the health of the Chinese government across the dynasties waxed and waned with any relation to some aspect of civil service examinations.

[8] Referred visceral pain is an example of an aversive stimuli-sensing system that gives very inexact answers, because it was never important enough to improve. If your arm is hurt, you can point to exactly where even with your eyes closed. But when people get appendicitis, very often in the early phase they point to the center of their abdomen around their belly button, and then gradually the pain moves to the area immediately over the appendix - but only after the overlying tissue, which is innvervated by somatic ("outside"-type nerves) is irritated. Often people with a problem in their abdominal organs or even their heart feel extremely sick and anxious and in general uncomfortable but can't point to any specific spot. Why does this make sense? If a scorpion scrambles up onto your left elbow is stinging you there, it's worth knowing exactly where the stinging is happening so you can act in a way that improves the situation. But if you were sitting around a fire with your tribe in the African Rift Valley 100,000 years ago with appendicitis, what exactly could you do about it? If you had bad stomach pain, it didn't matter exactly where it was; you curled up in a ball where your family members were nearby to care for and protect you and hoped it passed.

[9] In contrast to corporations, single-celled organisms survive best not when they have a low surface-area-to-volume ratio (like successful nimble corporations) but a low one, which is why they are mostly near-spherical. Corporations, while competing with each other and in some ways with their customers, are still operating in an environment that is predominantly cooperative, so it's better to have lots of customer interaction surface. Bacteria exist in an environment of constant unpredictable ruthless lawless natural selection. It's really about how much the surface is an asset for information gathering by the system, versus a liability to attack from competing systems. Consequently, for bacteria, the sacrifice of knowing less about the outside world (which at that scale is less predictable than our world anyway) must be worth it given the overall survival advantage gained by being in the shape that most maximizes distance of any unit volume from the surface. In contrast, there are cells in biology that maximize surface: neurons, and nutrient absorption membranes deep in the GI tract. Both of these exist deep in the organism (especially neurons) in a web of profound cooperation (also especially neurons.) Of course, some bacteria are rod-shaped, which is a higher surface area-to-volume shape thought to confer an advantage in terms of nutrient absorption - when that is the growth-limiting factor rather than attack by other systems, that is the shape we would expect to see. The more fractal a complex dynamic system, the more likely it is to exist in an environment of predominant cooperation. The more spherical a complex dynamic system, the more likely it is to exist in an environment of predominant competition. In the case of corporations, the shape is somewhat "virtual", but corresponds to points of contact per customer and ease of contact, which ultimately are still going to require space. Nations are somewhere in the middle, though it would be interesting to see if nations now, more cooperative and less violent than they historically were, are more likely to have fractal borders, or shared zones (my predictions) than one or two centuries ago.

[10]This corresponds to Level 3 operations as described here, which explain how large organizations work but is not an argument that they should work that way, for Level 3 organizational decisions often lead to the downfall of the organization, unless the inner circle in the super-Pareto distribution has the best interests of the organization at heart. In politics, maintaining the state's best interests happens either because the leaders have a feedback loop in the form of being beholden to an informed electorate as in functioning democracies, or less likely, by luck as with benevolent dictators, e.g. Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore, or the "good" Roman Emperors.

[11] There's an apparent conflict here. On one hand I'm arguing that systems become distorted because they're focused on self-perpetuation and ignore metrics. On the other I'm arguing that they focus on the metrics, which they game and become distorted. Both can be true at different times, and vary depending on the aversiveness of different stimuli.

[12] Organisms are exempt from becoming "rackets." Rackets are systems which have a claimed mission besides their self-perpetuation but in fact are only self-perpetuating, and organisms are openly survival systems, full stop, and make no claims to the contrary. In other words, organisms cannot be rackets, because organisms do not have mission statements to deviate from.

[13]It may not have escaped your notice that one implied solution - expand the system until it comprises the whole universe, and there is no self/non-self boundary - is, at least on the individual level, one advocated by many mystical traditions. We actually achieve this when we die, so in individual terms this could be re-formulated as "lose your fear of death". Yet our read-only hardware makes this a terrifying and unpleasant experience, even, empirically speaking, for life-long meditators. For now, this is not a real solution.


APPENDIX: Analogous Terms

Non-human OrganismHumanOrganization
Inputstimulusperception, belief, representationmeasurement, metric, dogma
Reflection, Output, Reactionresponsebelief, behaviordecision
Examples of GamingRare; some higher animals seek out "highs"Opioids, denial, delusionPreserving letter but not spirit; false or incoherent religious or political truth claims
Examples of crisisDeathPersonal disillusionment or deathRevolution or collapse

Saturday, September 28, 2019

Three Levels of Operations in Organizations

Humans are unspeakably complex objects, and the associations they form and the way their behavior affects those associations and is affected by, it even more complex. Nonetheless we can make some accurate predictions, the moreso when the number of individuals is higher. It's pretty difficult to predict if a single person will be worth more or less, or making more or less, a year from now (even with good information today), but we can make a decent guess about what the economy will do. That said, when we talk about groups of people - especially states - we oversimplify.

Level 1 thinking about organizational decisions and behavior - the single entity fallacy - is demonstrated when "Germany invaded Poland." "The Americans wanted to annex the territory all the way to the Pacific." "General Motors wants to buy Tesla." (I made that last one up.) These assertions are not meaningless, but they grossly (and probably necessarily) oversimplify the collective action of thousands or millions of people. We might picture a giant made of fused-together bodies serving the collective good. Something approaching this subsumption of identity and individual interests occurs more easily in smaller and more homogenous groups, and is easiest when individuals in those groups were programmed by pre-verbal and pre-rational early life experience to identify with the tribe and its authority. The leader in such a situation is showing transformational leadership, and this corresponds to Chapman's level 3. (See more about his model of levels at which humans derive meaning through their associations with each other.) Indeed, it has been argued from a philosophical standpoint that any group of people (married couple up to nation) cannot be said to have (consistent) preferences.

Level 2 thinking - the amalgamation of individuals fallacy - is more rarely seen, because it's more complicated and manifestly not how nations or individuals function. In this model, there are only individuals, constantly calculating what they're getting out of association with the group, and there is no group; or rather, the group exists only as a product of individual interests, and talking about the group's actions adds nothing to our understanding or to the accuracy of our predictions. Leaders in such situations are transactional, and this corresponds to Chapman's level 2. For obvious reasons, such associations tend to be unstable over time. This is more common in companies than states (since the former have a mostly or purely transactional mission), but even in companies, there is usually an identity-subsuming transformational aspect. And even in states, we do often see this in the a-ideological alliances and constant defections that occurred before the Enlightenment and democracy, and still occur in the developing world.

Level 3 thinking - There is a super-Pareto principle in how much the decisions of any individual in a (tribe, company, nation) affect every other individual, and this is helpful to come to a more useful and accurate model than the mere amalgamation of individuals. The people making the decisions are certainly influenced to some degree by personal interests that do not necessarily align with all the other individual members of the state (or company - for instance, institutional investors take note when a fund manager is nearing retirement, because s/he may start making decisions that benefit his/her retirement in the short term but not the company or its shareholders in the long term.) But they too likely have pre-rational tribal affiliation and also the concrete reality on the ground that this, and not some other tribe/company/nation is the one that they're in and helping to run. Furthermore, there is a constant feedback from the individual to the group (as in level 2) and then back from the group to the individual in the form of things like social norms. This is therefore the cyclic individual-within-group theory, and when companies or states seem to "make bad decisions", almost invariably they could be explained in the light of benefits or risks to individuals that don't track those to the organization overall. Interestingly, overproduction of elites is a core feature of Peter Turchin's predictions for the West and the U.S. in particular, and is an outstanding example of the cyclic individuals-within-groups model.

Thursday, August 29, 2019

Alternative History #8: Ancient East Indian Settlement of Australia

For the previous installment, see Alternative History #7: German-Led Native Shock Troops in California.

I've often wondered why Australia wasn't colonized by Chinese, or Indonesians, or Maori, prior to Europeans. Approaching from the north, Chinese and Indonesians would have encountered horrendous impenetrable swamps crawling with saltwater crocodiles. The Maoris might have had an easier time landing in what is now Victoria or New South Wales, but they only arrived in Aotearoa five centuries before Europeans. But if the Aboriginal Australians themselves made it to Australia 60,000 years ago, how hard could it be for someone who had an actual boat? Why not Indian explorers or traders? Even in that early era it's likely the Asians would have had substantially more advanced stone tools and stoneworking techniques than the Australians, which they would have introduced and which would have quickly spread through trade and warfare. Australia might also have been colonized by non-native fauna that they brought with them - non-marsupial mammals that would stick out against the evolutionary background of the isolated continent.

Once again, this isn't alternate history. I recently ran across a paper by Irina Pugach, working in Mark Stoneking's lab at Max Planck, showing genetic evidence of contact around four to five thousand years ago. Most intriguing, this is nearly simultaneous with a change in aboriginal stone tools and the introduction of dingoes to the continent. It's very hard to believe that's a coincidence. (Disclosure, for a year I worked for Stoneking as an undergrad, on a project showing the mtDNA evidence supporting a Polynesian origin for the settlers of Madagascar. This was with radioactive sequencing. If you could get 200 clean bp every 2 days, you were a wizard. I got a Howard Hughes monetary award for it in a research fair, not a grant.)

REFERENCE Pugach I, Delfin F, Gunnarsdóttir E, Kayser M, Stoneking M. Genome-wide data substantiate Holocene gene flow from India to Australia. PNAS January 29, 2013 110 (5) 1803-1808; https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1211927110

Sunday, August 18, 2019

Religious Adherents: Bad Stripe Not Visible, But Is This Data Meaningful?

Found this map at Perell.com. Whenever I see cultural maps of the U.S. like this one, I look for the Bad Stripe, a coherent area that pops out as below-average in maps of human development indices. It stretches roughly from far western PA through West Virginia, Kentucky, and Tennessee across Arkansas and into Oklahoma (see more here.) My expectation would be higher religious belief across the Bad Stripe; or, at least, some pattern that makes the Bad Stripe stick out from surrounding areas. Not present at all; and typically, lower human development = more religious. Bad Stripe or not, there are some big surprises on this map, and it doesn't really align with both what most Americans would expect, as well as my own experience traveling and living in the country. West Virginia is much less religious than Western Pennsylvania? Really? Central California has a religious stripe across the middle? I've lived near both these places and find this hard to believe. The Frontier Strip is evident but the Rockies, especially to the north, are mostly less religious than other rural areas - also very suspicious is the similar level of religiousness between rural and coastal areas of Pacific states. If California is going to have religious and unreligious zones, they're more likely to run north and south parallel to the (liberal, likely less religious) coast.

One problem across all such surveys is that how one defines "religious" (or in this case "religious adherents") matters a great deal. Was it something like asking "How important is religion to you?" Or "Do you belong to a church?" Looking at this map, I strongly suspect it was the second, and that many people in some area (eg West Virginia) that do not belong or regularly attend services would say that religion is quite important to them. A place that happens to have a single large church would look very religious, whereas a place where people were very religious but did not have many churches would look very un-religious.



Tuesday, July 23, 2019

Cause and Effect in Complex Systems - Think in Terms of Reinforcement Cycles

In the last post, I wrote about the virtuous cycle of labor gradually getting more valuable, driving the development of machines to extend that value, which in turn makes it more valuable still. This is an example of a potentially useful trick in reasoning about complex systems that avoids a cognitive pitfall.

In a complicated system in equilibrium, it is unlikely that a single element of many in the system could be responsible for a lasting perturbation or evolution to a new equilibrium. That is, reasoning about single-causes unidirectionally affecting the rest of the system is probably not a good way to improve our understanding. It's not like kicking a ball - foot causes ball to move, end of story - which is the way our brains seem to have developed to understand events on the order of a few seconds in the mesoscale world. (Notice even there that the ball moves once, stops, and the phenomenon is over.)

Mutually reinforcing sets of elements within the system are more likely to produce a lasting perturbation, that is, move the system to a new equilibrium. Looking for such reinforcement cycles can get us out of unproductive chicken-and-egg reasoning. Applying the idea to this case, it becomes evident that asking "Was it labor getting cheaper that caused the industrial revolution? Or the other way around?" is simplistic and unlikely to provide a clear and useful answer. It's better to ask, "What are the economic and social elements that reinforced each other in such a way as to produce the industrial revolution?" - along with other elements such as aspects of British culture at that time.

Another example would be the question: "Was increased use of tools and manual dexterity in early human ancestors a result of these ancestors favoring bipedal locomotion? Or the other way around?" They likely reinforced each other, along with other elements; i.e., increased adaptation to the savannah favoring bipedal locomotion to see further and tool use favoring survival in a drier, more open, less calorie-dense environment - et cetera.

The Value of Labor Over Time Is Still Increasing Over Time, Even Since the 1980s

As time moved forward, early economists increasingly appreciated the value added by the labor component. In the mid-1700s the physiocrats (like Turgot) thought that the value of land was pretty much the whole story, then a few decades later Smith recognized labor as an equally important component, and a half century after that Marx overshot the mark a bit when he argued that labor was the most important part of the story.

But each position was more correct in its own time, because the value-adding power of labor did increase over time. Economists have wondered why modern capitalism didn't develop in stable earlier market economies like ancient Rome, and the best argument so far is that the institution of slavery meant labor was cheap. As technology improved, so did the value-adding power of labor, and as labor became more valuable, the incentive to develop more technology to amplify labor also grew, in a virtuous cycle (see more about reinforcement cycles in complex systems here.) It's therefore not a surprise that the institution of slavery ended shortly thereafter, first in Britain, and later elsewhere. They couldn't afford to waste labor any longer![1] It's also telling that the natural experiment called the American Civil War - divide a country in half, one half has slavery, one half doesn't - which one develops its industry - and therefore wins when the two collide in war? It also makes sense that the least developed economies would be the ones most likely to persist in permitting slavery, e.g. Mauritania.

Many economists have also argued that starting in the early 1970s, the West had a technological and/or economic stagnation, and showed that the share of labor in the economy has been declining since then. The worry is that enough capital has accumulated that it has overtaken labor as the most meaningful input, and did not do so earlier because of world wars. This dominance of the capital component is the central concern of Piketty's Capital in the Twenty-First Century, in which he describes the growing divide between those who rely on income (most of us) and those who rely on capital accumulation (the very rich.)

But it's quite natural to wonder whether a lot of the return to labor is hidden, for instance in the accumulated wealth of high-value laborers - i.e., I don't think Peter Thiel or Bill Gates worry about their salary. This is why a new paper by Eisfeldt, Falato and Xiaolan (h/t Marginal Revolution) is very encouraging. Taking into account equity awarded as compensation to highly skilled labor, the apparent decline in labor share evaporates.

I would expect that there is still further hidden value accrued to labor and this paper has found only part of it.


[1] As a pointed aside: For those who point out (correctly) that most abolitionists were Christians and claim that the end of slavery was driven by morality rather than materialist considerations: the tacit acknowledgement of slavery in the Bible a big problem for this hypothesis, let alone the whole history of Christianity before the Enlightenment and industrial revolution when Christians had eighteen centuries to figure out slavery was wrong, but did not.

Saturday, April 20, 2019

Violence Control and the Mutual Recognition Cartel

Modern states are a cartel that mutually recognize each other's right to hold a monopoly on violence within their territory. The prospect of seasteading is a fundamental threat to nearby nations' legitimacy, and in fact to the Westphalian idea of a state, since suddenly there is territory near yours which was previously not only uninhabited but uninhabitable, and poof - suddenly there are people outside your control on your borders. Consequently we should expect that seasteads will produce a rapid and disproportionate response from any nearby nation, using any excuse they can to commandeer or destroy it. That I know of, there has been very little discussion in the seasteading/voluntary society community about the likelihood of this happening, and how to avoid it. Previously , it was predicted that it would be "a few years at most before the nearby country finds an excuse to attack them", but in this case it was actually on the order of weeks.

This past week, the Thai government noticed a seastead platform just outside its international waters:

US bitcoin trader and girlfriend could face death penalty over Thai 'seastead'
US national Chad Elwartowski and his Thai girlfriend, Supranee Thepdet (aka Nadia Summergirl), are facing charges of threatening the Kingdom's sovereignty. Last Sunday officials from the Royal Thai Navy and Phuket Maritime boarded the structure saying it violated Article 119 of the Criminal Code and also posed a navigational hazard.

The couple launched the 'Ocean Builders' seastead on February 2 off the coast of Phuket. The structure is located to the southeast of Koh Racha Yai, approximately 12 nautical miles (22.2 kilometres) from the mainland.

Elwartowski has claimed that his seastead is outside Thailand's territorial waters, but Thai authorities insist that it violates Article 119 and challenges Thailand's territorial rights.

"The Royal Thai Navy has full authority and duty to protect national interest and marine sovereignty in the area," according to a Navy spokesperson. (from thetaiger.com)

Besides the disproportionate response, most telling is that Thailand has not even bothered to claim that the seastead is within their territorial waters. The couple previously inhabiting the seastead has fled in fear of their lives. Immediately Thailand shows what's really going on - whatever theory of state recognition you subscribe to, it all unfortunately returns to violence and the control of violence - control of it within your territory (the police, to maintain order) and outside your territory (the military, to at least prevent conquest, if not expand your territory.) If a country can't do those two things, it's not a country, and can't even convincingly pretend to be a country for long - e.g., no one is very impressed with the "Somali" government's claim to actually be the state of Somalia, that is, the organization which holds a monopoly on violence within the territory not claimed by surrounding countries.

One objection: Luxembourg (for example) appears to be a viable state, yet can Luxembourg really claim to be able to repel an invasion from Germany or France? No, but very likely the blowback from other countries in the mutual-recognition-cartel that could harm Germany or France in some way is enough to stop them. Dictators often test the resolve of the cartel - most obviously, Putin by invading Crimea. Ukraine could not repel such an invasion, nor could they count on the cartel to come to their aid. So they can say that Crimea is still part of Ukraine, but de facto, it is part of Russia.

It's also worth pointing out that both Vietnam and China have built not seasteads, but whole new islands in international waters in the South China Sea. They and their allies have made a lot of noise about the other state's islands, but aside from a few harassing passes by aircraft, there has been no full naval take-down of the settlements. Why? Because each country (or its allies) have the ability to hold their territory by inflicting and defend against violence, and as countries, are already in the mutual-recognition club by virtue of being able to use the threat of force to defend their territory. (Which is how they can have allies to begin with.)

In actuality, the Thai seastead and state response isn't the first one. This is stated not to diminish the accomplishment, but rather to point out that there was another would-be sea-platform microstate in the 1960s in the North Sea, which was allowed by the nearby United Kingdom to persist - though they may have been a bit nervous about this and hope to escape the UK's attention. Consequently we might ask - why don't seasteaders set up shop off the Somalian coast, most of which has no real government? For the obvious reason of piracy, i.e., unpredictable exercise of force by individuals with no claim to political legitimacy, protection of territory/prevention of others' violence, or promise of maintaining/improving conditions. In this, it's obvious that seasteaders would like to benefit from the nearby state's violence control, without paying taxes or following other rules. (In fact, Sealand had difficulty controlling violence within its borders, or preventing criminal behavior, and the UK's hands-off attitude had a lot to do with that.) A critique of "fundamentalist" little-l libertarianism in general is that it's only conceivable when there is already a state regulating commons and controlling violence that guarantees social arrangements - and a very similar argument can be made for socialism in states already wealthy-by-capitalism, also an unsustainable strategy. (Something very similar happened on Minerva reef in the Pacific in the 70s when Tonga suddenly decided it had to control the reef once settlers showed up.)

It's probably not good for anyone to dwell for too long on the basic fact that humans have never devised a system to organize themselves beyond the level of family without a threat of violence, and it seems that theories of state recognition are designed to be legalistic dances that distract us from this brute fact. The political scientist who imagines a system that allows the non-violent creation of new states that can actually take natural precedence over force will go down as the greatest philosopher in history - along with the one that figures out a way besides physical space to determine which laws apply to which people, thus making a more truly voluntary society. I'm very sad for the couple that tried to seastead off of Thailand, but they were more than a little naive. For now, I predict that any seastead, even one far out in the middle of the ocean inarguably in international waters, will quickly find itself dismantled by a state navy unless they have sufficient outward directed force - and will not be able to control their internal violence without pre-emptive threats of violence.

Thursday, March 28, 2019

Evidence for Coordinated Labor in Agriculture Hypothesis of Early State Formation (CLAHSF)

Early states tended to emerge in places that were actually somewhat marginal for agriculture, quite counterintuitively. (Most recent discussion here.) When combined with the example of China (which is not at all marginal for agriculture), the connecting argument that emerges is that states appear where central coordination of labor is required for agriculture, there is a benefit to population, and a centrally organized society develops. This can occur either because of marginal conditions (e.g. timing the flooding of a river surrounded by a vast desert) or difficult crops that require more central coordination, e.g., rice. Conversely, in places where the land easily produces calories, there is little benefit to central coordination, as dissatisfied "citizens" can easily refuse to cooperate and move away, and not lose any benefit in terms of population growth.

One way to test this would be to look at political stability within an early state - within a single early state - and how stability correlates with agriculture-favoring (or -disfavoring) climate changes. This hypothesis (CLAHSF) would be falsified if improved conditions outside the central areas of a state improved state stability, and if worsened conditions outside the central area de-stabilized the state. Ola Olsson from the University of Gothenburg shows that in fact, when the ancient Egyptian "hinterlands" received better rainfall (which improved agriculture in a desert climate), there was a delayed de-stabilizing effect on the Egyptian state, "since the decline in effective circumscription provides the farming population with an outside option in the hinterland."

Ola Olsson (University of Gothenburg), "Pharaoh's Cage: Environmental Circumscription and Appropriability in Early State Development", IAST General Seminar, Toulouse: IAST, March 29, 2019, 11:30–12:30, room MF323.

Thursday, March 21, 2019

The Three Ways of Dealing with Outsiders: Sub-Humans, Ignorance, or Evangelism

Humans have so far fully developed only three ways of dealing with outsiders:
  1. remaining ignorant of them (or feigning ignorance)
  2. considering them sub-humans and acting maliciously or merely neglecting them
  3. evangelizing and assimilating them
By "outsider" I mean "people whose behavior is perceived to differ in morally important ways". Those morally important ways are often things like what moral authority you follow, supernatural or otherwise; what you eat; sexual practices; and boundaries of socially sanctioned violence.

You can be perceived as an outsider because you are of a different ethnic group, political system or party, or religion, among other things, whether or not your behavior actually does differ. This seems to offer hope, in case the perceived differences can be found to be mere labels with no real differences in behavior. But that is not always, or even usually, the case. It's not just perception; there are morally important differences. Either a man laying with another man is moral, or it is not. Either violently taking property from the bourgeoisie is moral, or it is not. Either honor killings are moral, or they are not. And inspired by an example from Robert Frank's Choosing the Right Pond: either it is okay to eat ponies, or it is not. It is very difficult to see what a mutually beneficial coexistence might be for people with conflicting views of these things.

We have now arrived at the central problem, which goes as follows.

a) There are genuine differences between groups of humans in moral behavior
b) This forces a choice as to whether morality extends to a morally different group or not
c) If we are living with a morally different group, they may not want your morality extended to them; if you don't extend your morality to them, you are implying that they are not human.

This is a dismal hypothesis, as these three ways are obviously sub-optimal for human dignity and the functioning of a modern multi-ethnic state, so it is imperative that we understand them, and possibly find new ones.

Name of strategyIgnoranceSub-humansEvangelize
InteractionTrade, at most*Living with
Underlying strategy(no strategy)DegradeAssimilate


This could be called either the triune theory of moral resolution, or ISE (sounds like "ice" - for Ignorance, Sub-humans, and Evangelism.) They are as follows.

1. Ignorance - for most of the lifespan of our species, humans have lived in small hunter-gatherer groups. Consequently we were spared from having to deal with outsiders. Even if you know they exist, if you don't have to interact with them, then you don't care that much how they behave. You might still interact with them minimally, transactionally, through trade* - often on neutral ground, and possibly not even sharing a common language. (When we behave transactionally, we're calculating and not engaging most of our social cognition.) They don't sleep in your territory and don't eat at your table, or only in settings which are carefully controlled by the tribe or state and prevent extensive contact between populations. This "non-strategy" is what obtained throughout all of pre-history, but starting in the Neolithic this strategy was no longer stable, as some populations began to expand into their neighbors' territories.


2. Sub-humans - unfortunately, the easy and automatic response when you live around people morally different from you is to consider them sub-humans. There is a wide spectrum of how we do this in terms of active, conscious malice. Starting on the more malicious end: you might outright condemn them as filthy animals and sometimes even actively exterminate them. You might just keep them sequestered in ghettoes or certain roles where they can't contaminate the rest of society. There might be a split between upper and lower classes of the dominant group, with the upper classes not worrying much about the sub-humans as long as they stay in their undesirable roles, and the lower class much more resentful, since they sometimes have to work alongside the sub-humans and their own jobs are more threatened by the sub-humans. You might appear to tolerate them because you aren't overly bothered by them, but it's only because the gentiles are dirty and going to hell anyway (or whatever the local terminology is) and you just accept that they can't help themselves. (Minorities with moral codes differing from the majority often take this last position of feigning tolerance and just keeping to themselves, as they're forced to do so if they're not going to agree that they themselves are in fact the sub-humans, and the other options aren't open to them - they're in no position to be exterminating anyone else.)

Most subtly and softly, as is often the case in modern states - you might even be horrified at the suggestion that you're capable of this - but there are groups of people in your society for whom you've drastically lowered your expectations. The Ottoman strategy of governing people, allowing a multi-confessional empire, seems quite modern in some ways - but I'm sure most people in the capital didn't regard with admiration the pork-eating Christians they allowed confessional self-governance. You may even have caught yourself, in the pony-eating example above, finding reasons to excuse the pony-eaters from full moral evaluation, though I doubt if you were told you were invited to a pony-eating party you would be excited.

We also sometimes categorize people in our own society as sub-human, usually based on class. The upper classes do this with the lower classes to explain why they "under-perform" (but might also try to evangelize them about how to improve, i.e., be more like the upper class.) The lower classes do this to the upper class to explain why the upper class has more money - it's not because they're better, it's because they're immoral, engaging in bizarre practices behind closed doors, and they have lots of dealings with dirty foreigners. The lower class of a dominant group rarely evangelizes the upper class, because this exposes that the lower class in the end would actually want to join the upper class, and exposes their self-comforting fiction.

Because moral rules sometimes place inconvenient restrictions on economics, multiple times throughout history conventions have evolved where a sub-human outsider is actually employed to perform morality-violating acts. (E.g., shabbas goys who tend fires on the sabbath, or eta in Japan. How exactly the employer or trading partner avoids naughty-points for this is quite mysterious.)

In some cases sub-humanism can be "escaped" by assimilation, which requires both the desire of those considered sub-human to be accepted by those considering them sub-human, and those considering them sub-human to want them to escape. This seems like evangelism (see below), but the difference is that there is no open recognition of the former sub-humans having joined the dominant group; indeed after the fact, they're loathe to note that there was ever anything different about them in the first place.

As mentioned, sub-humanism is the default option when morally differing people move out of the "ignorance" category, and this transition is all too easy. Very often this is discovered by traders who have overstayed their welcome. In the current populist surge, we are witnessing discussion of "globalists" now, either outsiders, or people tainted by outsiders through business loyalties. Persian merchants were slaughtered during the Guangzhou massacre for explicitly this reason. The Dutch merchants living near Nagasaki during the Tokugawa Shogunate never made the ignorance-to-subhuman transition because the Shogun kept them sequestered on an island, consistent with state practices that repeatedly appeared in history to keep the population ignorant.


3. Evangelism - This is a more difficult strategy in the sense that it is not innate to humans, but it has been very effective for expanding empires that aim to retain stability. In this strategy, you recognize your neighbors as human - and want to help them! (To avoid Hell, become more economically successful, etc.) So you Christianize them, or send advisors to make them more capitalist/communist, or otherwise "civilize" them in general, etc. Witness Thomas Jefferson's well-meaning attempts to civilize native Americans, the British white man's burden to educate and develop Africa, and communists' attempts to export revolution. (Reading about Che Guevara's frustrations in Bolivia or the Congo, you could almost do a find-and-replace with Thomas Jefferson's irritation with assimilation-resistant native Americans, or anyone working in an NGO in the Muslim parts of the developing world.) Compare the non-evangelical religions to the evangelical ones (better-adapted ones which appeared later in history) and note how they emphasize brotherhood in the faith over national origin. Obviously none of these were done with purely altruistic motives, but the impulse to assimilate rather than exterminate is on plain display.

If this strategy is made to work, it is dramatically successful - witness the success of the Roman Empire, the United States, Christianity, and Islam - although often the evangelized don't want to be assimilated (but that's just because they're incorrigible sub-humans, off with their heads!) This mode can fail as well - when Jews in Spain were forced to convert to Christianity after the final departure of the Moors, this wasn't satisfactory to the rest of the population, who could never be convinced that the conversos were not underneath their baptisms still sub-humans (and the more attempts to convince that the conversion was true, the more outraged the mobs became.) The populism in twenty-first century America is a turn from evangelism as well - from the ideal of the melting pot, to anger that too many foreigners are polluting the creed and are still, underneath their iPhones and Starbucks, sub-humans.

There are instructive differences between states that otherwise seem to have some of the same sorts of beliefs, but where one is more clearly evangelizing than the other. One example is the differences between the Soviet Union and modern China. The USSR was trying to export revolution, because (besides of course strategic reasons) they believed in the universality of communism. China has quickly regressed to the historical mean, and is concerned about their territory, and Chinese people, full stop, even producing tracts on the genetic superiority of the Han - but they don't seem to care much whether the people in Africa for whom they're building roads and stadiums agree. (When ethnic supremacy doctrines are espoused, a tribe or nation is lauding its own immutable and unobtainable heritage, a sure sign of the sub-human strategy instead of evangelism.)



Can There Be Any Solution?

The hypothesis can seem worrisome in the sense of unfalsifiability. It's tempting to play the game of putting every interaction between morally differing people into one of the three boxes - "Are you aware of their existence? You're not ignorant of them then. Do you think what they're doing is wrong, or not care? You consider them sub-humans. Do you want to help them? You're evangelizing." Indeed, most such interactions really do fit.

But we will hopefully never go back to being ten thousand disconnected tribes, able to ignore each other's differences. The way forward will likely depend on the aforementioned sometimes-present gap between perception and reality. In some cases, the perceived differences are not real concrete differences in behavior. For example: the country you live in predicts your moral sense better than your religion. You may claim you share convictions with Muslims or Christians, but your behavior is more likely to resemble your neighbor from another religion than it is someone in a developing country of your religion. I was struck by this when looking at examples of surveys of Christians and atheists in the United States. With rare exceptions, they make the same moral choices in the same situations. It's not just the cliche of focusing on similarities over differences; rather, we need to focus on the concrete outcomes of beliefs. What do our moral convictions actually make us do? If we do the same things for the same reasons, and we're all aiming for a world with more human flourishing, then that makes living together much easier. This approach (of actually dissecting the effects of beliefs) has really only begun in earnest in the past few decades, and it may be a fourth way. My hope is that the people and nations that are able to make this work, in at least part of their populations, will out-compete the other models, just as the evangelism strategy out-competed sub-humanism. I think explicit reasoning about and repudiation of slavery, and later racism, is one such example, although the increasing value of labor certainly helped (both ability to reason morally and increasing value of labor were themselves both products of increasing rationality, i.e. the Enlightenment.) Very metropolitan trade-oriented cities may also be early examples of the fourth way - trade cities on ports have long been thought of as more "relaxed" culturally than the hinterlands around them. I submit that they are not "less moral", nor are they evangelical places, but rather they're necessarily consequentialist. Ironically, it's precisely the transactionalism of New York or London that have driven this; thinking more abstractly about actual effects of behavior prevented conflict between traders during the "ignorance" mode, and it can (and is) again. Voltaire recognized the emergence of such a system of coexistence when he said
Go into the London Stock Exchange – a more respectable place than many a court – and you will see representatives from all nations gathered together for the utility of men. Here Jew, Mohammedan and Christian deal with each other as though they were all of the same faith, and only apply the word infidel to people who go bankrupt. Here the Presbyterian trusts the Anabaptist and the Anglican accepts a promise from the Quaker. On leaving these peaceful and free assemblies some go to the Synagogue and others for a drink, this one goes to be baptized in a great bath in the name of Father, Son and Holy Ghost, that one has his son's foreskin cut and has some Hebrew words he doesn't understand mumbled over the child, others go to heir church and await the inspiration of God with their hats on, and everybody is happy.
You might object that a transactional relationship is not a full one, and you would be correct. Here we can take advantage of the millions of people who we live among in the modern age - you don't have to interact with every single member of your society, and the ones you choose to interact with, you choose at what level you do.

In one sense, this approaches the voluntary ideal. That said, it may be that the only solution to coexisting with people who perceive genuine moral differences is to limit the interaction in this way. And this does seem much better than sub-humanism or assimilation. In cases where concrete moral actions really do differ and people must live intimately together (especially with very limited resources), I have no solution. This should be added to the list of political science problems, along with how to organize a truly voluntary state that is not determined by physical territory (see also here.)


*A complicating observation of tribes (usually not nations) who are mostly ignorant of each other is that one of the "interactions" can be warfare. In traditional tribal warfare, there are ceremonies, there are few casualties relative to what might otherwise have occurred given the technology available, and there are agreed-upon conventions: we don't fight each other when it's raining because our warpaint runs off; we stand in order lines and kneel and fire our muskets because only cowards hide behind trees like savages; etc. (See the Aztec Flower Wars for a well-documented example.) Every so often we witnessed a sudden transition from traditional to modern warfare, with a disregard of previous conventions and much higher casualties (or even extermination; see here for discussion of this in Iroquois and Mongols) that in this framework represents a transition to sub-humanism. As with trade, in traditional warfare, you remain basically ignorant of the other tribe because you have very limited "interaction" with them. The complication is that clearly there must be some cultural norms shared between the two tribes for this arrangement to occur, although again, interaction is quite limited other than at the highest level of the tribe or state.


Sunday, March 17, 2019

A Morbid Calculation: Conquest Rate of the Americas and Cultural Assimilation Rates


The first European set foot on what would later become the United States in 1513. The last uncontacted indigenous person was captured in 1911. Many people are familiar with the story of Ishi; the picture above is of the monument commemorating the place in Oroville, California where he came under the power of European-descended people. (Image credit to Ray_Explores on Flickr.) This marker commemorates not just Ishi, but the date and place at which an entire nation's worth of indigenous people had finally been completely assimilated or exterminated - on August 29, 1911.

If taken in terms of territory, if it's just a linear expansion of a certain amount per unit time, then the annual expansion was 9,450 sq mi (24,729 km^2) per year; meaning a square of land about 98 miles (157 km) on a side. If we break it down to the day, then the U.S. was taking 26 sq mi per day (blocks 5.1 miles on a side.) Given the average American County size, that means every 46.5 days (about a month and a half) the U.S. was taking a county's worth of land in our march to manifest destiny. (I realize it didn't happen this smoothly but it gives us an idea.)

If we go by percent expansion (the more land you already got, the faster you get more), and we assume Ponce de Leon's camp when he landed was a square a hundredth of a mile on a side, then Europeans expanded at an average annual rate of 6.31%. Again, assuming this was a completely smooth process just for visualization purposes, that means the last year the US would have added territory equal to an area bigger than California but smaller than Texas. If going down to the day, the day Ishi was captured/gave himself up the US added half a county's worth of land.

But people are what we're most interested in here, and in human terms, the annualized assimilation rate for the United States of 4.1% over those 398 years. Obviously the size of the territory matters; to get a second data set to investigate territory size effects, I tried to find a similar event in the history of Canada but could not. With more than one country, we could get an idea of how the territory affects the rate.

Although it's not a conquest in the same way, it's been noted that the time for Germanic people to take over the Western Roman Empire was about six centuries, which corresponds to a 2.45% annualized rate of assimilation. In territory, in linear terms it's more than seven times slower, gaining 1,292 sq mi/year (an area 35.9 miles on a side.) In percentage terms, it's a 3.89% annual increase, using the same assumptions, i.e. same starting area, except this time it's a camp in the Black Forest instead of the Florida Coast. This is to be expected given that transportation was not as good and the technology gap between the Germanic tribes and the Romans was not nearly as great as between Europeans and North Americans; same people have likened colonization to being invaded by people from 4,000 years in the future.

Saturday, March 9, 2019

How Do People Decide Which Experts to Trust?

A summary of the aim of modern propaganda is this: dictators don't do propaganda so people believe something but so they believe nothing. And more importantly, do nothing. In a modern society, no one individual is in a position to evaluate every scientific, medical, or political claim we hear, so we rely on experts. A central technique for saboteurs of public discourse is to undermine confidence in experts. It's therefore important to understand how people actually evaluate experts.

Hendriks, Kienhues and Bromme (2015) use the Muenster Epistemic Trustworthiness Inventory and show that people's evaluations are affected by three considerations: level of expertise, integrity, and benevolence. People are predisposed to discount any expert opinion that conflicts with their chosen moral authority. Consequently, it's not surprising that efforts to undermine experts frequently focus on integrity ("They're shills/they're only in it for the money" etc.)

This is an important tool not only for understanding propaganda attacks from Russia and other governments, but critically analyzing our own responses to expert opinions, especially ones we're inclined to disagree with. It also provides a way to understand why someone might listen to a celebrity instead of a scientist, if the belief in integrity and benevolence outweighs the expertise factor.


Hendriks F, Kienhues D, Bromme R (2015) Measuring Laypeople’s Trust in Experts in a Digital Age: The Muenster Epistemic Trustworthiness Inventory (METI). PLoS ONE 10(10): e0139309. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0139309

Sunday, February 24, 2019

Predicting When a State Will Centralize

A 2015 paper by Koyama, Moriguchi and Sng (KMS) builds a model based on modern China and Japan's different experiences, suggesting a mechanism for how external threat and internal political and geographic characteristics drive centralization, as in Japan's case - or makes the state collapse, as in China's case. The small states either centralize to defend against the external threat or cease to exist, and due to their size, centralizing is not so difficult. The large states might not centralize, since there may be local disincentives that the central ruler cannot overcome. Consequently by the early twentieth century, the Japan (feudal a mere century before) emerged as a great power, and China (a centralized rich empire a century before) collapsed. KMS give statistics about railway-miles built per decade as a proxy for overall modernization, of course, referring to the dismantling of the Woosung Railway by the Qing.

This is intriguing, because it is not only consistent but complementary with the "labor-intensive agriculture drives state formation" hypothesis, and gives us a fuller picture of the appearance of the first states and their subsequent spread. The marginal agriculture hypothesis of state formation (MAHSF, pronounced "MASH-F") observes, again counterintuitively, that the first states (originating in a political analog of "spontaneous generation") tend to emerge in places which are actually quite marginal for agriculture. Like: the Nile Delta in the Sahara, which has to be irrigated in a time-sensitive and labor-intensive way; or, the Fertile Crescent, fertile only (again) if it is irrigated. Or the dry central Mexican highlands, or the Peruvian Andes. Not the plains of southeast Asia, or the Pacific Northwest, where even hunter-gatherers could develop a rich material culture.

But on consideration, MAHSF has an obvious flaw, which is China. (Any theory of state formation that does not account for the emergence of China is not a theory of state formation>) China was founded on fertile wet plains still today used for rice cultivation, and the exception shows that it's not a marginal physical environment, but rather the requirement for centralized labor, which played chicken-and-egg with centralized state capacity. Consequently a better account is the coordinated labor in agriculture hypothesis of state formation (CLAHSF, proncounced "CLASH-F.") It doesn't matter whether you live along a river in the desert and have to centrally organize labor because of the marginal environment, or you unfortunately have chosen a "tyrannical" crop like rice which places similar demands on its harvesters. In such a setting, advantage goes to the group that can organize labor, and the population and the state grows. CLAHSF explains why states emerge in certain places, and KMS provide a mechanism for how state formation "spreads" from those original nuclei. In the Old World, there are basically two nuclei and three vectors: from the Middle East to Europe and the Mediterranean; from the Middle East east along the Indian Ocean; and from China to the rest of East Asia. You'll notice the absence of Egypt, but modern Europeans, North Africans and Middle Easterners are much more the inheritors of statecraft and culture in general from the Fertile Crescent than from Egypt.

KMS apply their theory beyond China and Japan and look at both Anglo-Saxon England (ultimately unified by Alfred in response to Norse invasions) and Muscovy (in response to the Mongols; and Russians still psychologically think of Ukraine as a buffer state - the "Wild Fields" - since the Mongols easily crossed prairies but halted at the boundary of the boreal forest.) A third example that cries out for such a treatment would be the first unification of India after Alexander's arrival at its frontier; not to mention the seeming counterexample, why the Greeks, even after a long-standing threat from the Persians, never did manage to unify and remained a set of city-states - to be over-run by Alexander.

An entirely different question is why China, which to this day can be seen as the amalgamation of ethnicities it is (with the Han dominating in the east) unified so early, and essentially stayed unified under different rulers (as if the Roman Empire had never fallen), when Europe had one such period early on, which was never repeated (a Warring States period that never ended.) Thought experiment reversing this here.


Koyama M, Moriguchi C, Sng Tuan-Hwee. Geopolitics and Asia's Little Divergence: A Comparative Analysis of State Building in China and Japan after 1850. GMU Working Paper in Economics No. 15-54, 19 Nov 2015.

Friday, February 15, 2019

The Death of Subculture: Gibson's Failure and Chapman's Explanation

If you're a geek of a certain age (i.e., middle) you've read Neuromancer. And lines from this novel may occasionally come back to you, and not just the opening hook about Chiba. For me, one of the repeaters is

Night City was like a deranged experiment in social Darwinism, designed by a bored researcher who kept one thumb permanently on the fast-forward button.

This sets the frenetic hyper-competitive pace of the future. In Gibson's future, youth culture followed suit:

Fads swept the youth of the Sprawl at the speed of light: entire subcultures could rise overnight, thrive for a dozen weeks, and then vanish utterly.

And here Gibson did what science fiction does best - straight-line extrapolation, which often fails, as it did here.

My own youth subculture was metal (which drags on into old age for many of us.) But rather than accelerating in their life cycles, subcultures seemed to disappear as a cultural phenomenon. I realized this when I was passing through a very small remote town in the western U.S. on a vacation in 2008, saw a gaggle of teenagers with metal shirts and trenchcoats by the side of the road, and realized that I hadn't seen such an assemblage for years by that point. I speculated about the mechanism here.

David Chapman at Meaningness has an explanation which, while not necessarily in conflict with this mechanism, is much broader and relates the phenomenon to modes of developing meaning, understanding of morality, and explains why a counterculture appeared, then subcultures (a "native" mode prevalent from 1975-2000 for Gen Xers), then the atomization of youth culture in the aughts. The full chart is here (you REALLY should view and consider it), but the specific discussion of subcultures is here.